Foreign Policy Magazine
Posted By Thomas E. Ricks![]()
Thursday, February 14, 2013 - 10:41 AM![]()
Best Defense guest columnist
Question Set Five -- Historical case studies suggest that minimum force, civil primacy, and acting within the law are vital. But those historical case studies -- are we sure about them? Now I know all about the wide and varied research that could be used to back up the principles articulated in FM 3-24; I have read Christopher Paul's and Colin Clarke's skillful deconstruction of Gentile's argument that FM 3-24 is "evidence free". The supplementary questions that underpin this question relate to how many of these campaigns were actually used by the authors of FM 3-24? Was the insurgency in Tajikistan really at the forefront of the authors' minds? Or were they in fact relying more on a narrow spectrum of British and French experiences? I suspect they probably were. Are Malaya, Kenya and Algeria ringing any bells?
So we are in fact drawing some pretty big conclusions from a pretty narrow sample size. And as the next question will suggest, some of those historical case studies might not actually stand up to scrutiny.
(To be continued)
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Kriegsakademie
Perhaps it is best to look at FM 3-24 the way one might look at a Swiss Army manual on mountain infantry tactics. If, for whatever reason, a battalion from the U.s. 10th Mountain found itself in the Austrian Alps, there would probably be much to be learned and used from the Swiss FM. If the 10th Mountain Bn was fighting in the Pyrenees, the fit might be a bit less. If they were deployed in the Atlas mountains, considerable chunks of the Swiss FM might not apply, and when they took on a skilled mountain opponent in the Peruvian Andes they might have to discard almost the entire FM. FM 3-24 sought to capture some experiences from Algeria and from a couple of other very specific settings. When we seek to apply the FM’s Algerian lessons in Afghanistan or Somalia, they probably don’t fit much better than the Swiss FM applied to mountain warfare in the Andes. FM 3-24 should be seen for what it is, a compendium of interesting, quaint, parochial and largely obsolete military experience that has limited relevance to most of what the American military has to face in the coming decades.
JPWREL
Kriegsakademie
Just as a side note I have heard that the 10th Mountain Div., is ‘Mountain’ in name only. The troops are neither trained nor physically fit for Alpine service in any mountains whether it is the Andes or the Adirondacks. This is sort of the same as calling Major Mcilwaine's regiment ‘Hussars’, except people know that the Major turned in his horse and sabre a long time ago. But in this case they actually think that the US Army has a real ‘mountain’ division.
Just as a side note I have heard that the 10th Mountain Div., is ‘Mountain’ in name only. The troops are neither trained nor physically fit for Alpine service in any mountains whether it is the Andes or the Adirondacks. This is sort of the same as calling Major Mcilwaine's regiment ‘Hussars’, except people know that the Major turned in his horse and sabre a long time ago. But in this case they actually think that the US Army has a real ‘mountain’ division.
Tyrtaios
Excellent, the good Major is back on the money with COIN having briefly dabbled at being a movie critic.
Before I go into my ramble on the question at hand, let me briefly throw a couple of COINs into the fountain to remind everyone who believes in wishes coming true that if one takes an old shit sandwich, but rather than starting anew with a different filling, such as the duct tape of meat, Spam for instance, and merely put fresh raisin bread around it, one will only get a magnificent looking shit sandwich that in the end, tastes the same.
The foregoing above stated, the question as I interpret it is whether some historical case studies on insurgent conflicts might not actually stand up to scrutiny which may give us cause to question if our doctrine contained in FM 3-24 might be based on less than complete actual case studies in their entirety?
In response to that let me use as an example of Frenchman LtCol David Galula and his petit secteur militaire assigned to him in 1950s Algeria, and from which he later chronicled his methods along with theories in his book, "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice," which Dr. Bernard B. Fall, no lightweight himself, gave high praise to as well . . . And I might add, is where I first heard of the man during my reading of Fall's, "Street Without Joy," which would seem on the face of it, a pretty good recommendation . . . not from me but from Fall.
However, some closer inspection of the French war in Algeria shows that several methods were successfully used and not one particular method may have been workable as a whole, nor I would add should we or could we use many of those same methods so some perspective must be used when offering up examples of what are held-up as past successful models of counter-insurgency.
In this particular case that perspective is remembering that Galula was a colonialist, and unlike ourselves that are supposed to be using the ole 'hearts and minds counter-insurgency model as an appeal to a populations' aspirations for liberty, justice, good governance, etc. Galula, on the flip-side of the COIN, felt strongly that military control of the population was first priority, regardless of that populations' right to self-determination.
Adding further that Galula operated quite a distance from the French Tri-Color flag with more leeway than others perhaps, and although good or bad, France was the government in Algeria, none of that good or bad, had reached his small military sector, and therefore he was able to become the defacto government and not have to be concerned about appealing to local elites trying to keep their status quo or disturbing the economy by passing cash around continually.
Therefore, although I believe something can be learned from other's past experiences and theories, to include those of the more prominent insurgent themselves. The bottom line is that after this long period of foreign military involvement we need to take a look at what has and hasn't worked for us, not old colonial models, determining where and why it might not have worked elsewhere due to various factors.
Once we do that, we can then point to our doctrine without question that it is based on our own theories and practices, and not partially on one long dead man that we can no longer talk with for clarification and came to America, to some degree down on his luck, and found the timing right with America's early involvement in Viet-Nam.
Before I go into my ramble on the question at hand, let me briefly throw a couple of COINs into the fountain to remind everyone who believes in wishes coming true that if one takes an old shit sandwich, but rather than starting anew with a different filling, such as the duct tape of meat, Spam for instance, and merely put fresh raisin bread around it, one will only get a magnificent looking shit sandwich that in the end, tastes the same.
The foregoing above stated, the question as I interpret it is whether some historical case studies on insurgent conflicts might not actually stand up to scrutiny which may give us cause to question if our doctrine contained in FM 3-24 might be based on less than complete actual case studies in their entirety?
In response to that let me use as an example of Frenchman LtCol David Galula and his petit secteur militaire assigned to him in 1950s Algeria, and from which he later chronicled his methods along with theories in his book, "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice," which Dr. Bernard B. Fall, no lightweight himself, gave high praise to as well . . . And I might add, is where I first heard of the man during my reading of Fall's, "Street Without Joy," which would seem on the face of it, a pretty good recommendation . . . not from me but from Fall.
However, some closer inspection of the French war in Algeria shows that several methods were successfully used and not one particular method may have been workable as a whole, nor I would add should we or could we use many of those same methods so some perspective must be used when offering up examples of what are held-up as past successful models of counter-insurgency.
In this particular case that perspective is remembering that Galula was a colonialist, and unlike ourselves that are supposed to be using the ole 'hearts and minds counter-insurgency model as an appeal to a populations' aspirations for liberty, justice, good governance, etc. Galula, on the flip-side of the COIN, felt strongly that military control of the population was first priority, regardless of that populations' right to self-determination.
Adding further that Galula operated quite a distance from the French Tri-Color flag with more leeway than others perhaps, and although good or bad, France was the government in Algeria, none of that good or bad, had reached his small military sector, and therefore he was able to become the defacto government and not have to be concerned about appealing to local elites trying to keep their status quo or disturbing the economy by passing cash around continually.
Therefore, although I believe something can be learned from other's past experiences and theories, to include those of the more prominent insurgent themselves. The bottom line is that after this long period of foreign military involvement we need to take a look at what has and hasn't worked for us, not old colonial models, determining where and why it might not have worked elsewhere due to various factors.
Once we do that, we can then point to our doctrine without question that it is based on our own theories and practices, and not partially on one long dead man that we can no longer talk with for clarification and came to America, to some degree down on his luck, and found the timing right with America's early involvement in Viet-Nam.
JPWREL
The good Major’s suggestion that COIN via FM 3-24 may have transmuted itself in to Gentile’s 'evidence free’ doctrine reminds me of something I read awhile back in Robert Citino’s ‘The German Way of War’. Following the Versailles Peace Treaty with Germany in 1919, General Hans von Seeckt inherited the remnants of the German Army. Von Seeckt was a refined intellectual soldier who believed in a rigorous examination of all evidence and theories pertaining to war.
As Citino explains von Seeckt thought there was nothing he disliked more than ‘Schlagworte’ (slogans). With his unsentimental and purely objective view von Seeckt believed that catchy turns of phase were an anathema because they took on the ring of truth but were in reality spoken out of context, mis-understood and usually could not stand up to deeper analysis.
“Slogans, according to von Seeckt “were a way of life for those unable to think for themselves. Every slogan should leave the listener asking one question. Is this really true?” In von Seeckt's time he used as an example the famous double–envelopment at the battle of ‘Cannae’ in 216 BC. In our time perhaps ‘COIN’ fills that one-size–fits-all solution to low intensity war and has not withstood rigorous examination?
As Citino explains von Seeckt thought there was nothing he disliked more than ‘Schlagworte’ (slogans). With his unsentimental and purely objective view von Seeckt believed that catchy turns of phase were an anathema because they took on the ring of truth but were in reality spoken out of context, mis-understood and usually could not stand up to deeper analysis.
“Slogans, according to von Seeckt “were a way of life for those unable to think for themselves. Every slogan should leave the listener asking one question. Is this really true?” In von Seeckt's time he used as an example the famous double–envelopment at the battle of ‘Cannae’ in 216 BC. In our time perhaps ‘COIN’ fills that one-size–fits-all solution to low intensity war and has not withstood rigorous examination?
Kriegsakademie
Major Tom: were they in fact relying more on a narrow spectrum of British and French experiences: Malaya, Kenya and Algeria. As one of the legions who worked on the US COIN doctrine, the answer is “Yes”......... Is that a pretty small sample? Yes. ............ It is too small a sample to permit any conclusions? Perhaps, but it suggests (to me) that COIN is a very limited tool-set that worked to some degree in a few places under special conditions. The United States has never run a COIN-like venture under those conditions and in those places. I suspect we never will At the time (of sriting the COIN manual) the worker-bees recognized that of that small sample (Malaya, Kenya and Algeria) only one really turned out decently in the long run. ..................So, if the sample boils down to one long-term success, it is a great foundation for planning the force posture of America’s military for the 21st century? Probably not……………….K
DILNIR
How about this campaign? Not a sniff of a colonial struggle here. Who knows, perhaps there is a COIN study, with the Contras being the evil-doers.
http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume2/march_2004/3_04_3.html
http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume2/march_2004/3_04_3.html
Thursday, February 14, 2013
COIN is dead, long live the COIN
By Ryan Evans ![]()
Friday, December 16, 2011 - 11:27 AM![]()
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Some of these methods had already been practiced in Iraq byinnovative commanders, but Gen. David Petraeus, who oversaw the process of writingFM 3-24 and later went on to command U.S. forces in the country, was key to theirinstitutionalization and broad implementation in the context of an overalltheater-level strategy.
As President Barack Obama decided to "surge" forces intoAfghanistan in late 2009, former Joint Special Operations Command head Gen.Stanley McChrystal was tasked to follow the Petraeus playbook in Afghanistan.When he was relieved, Petraeus, the man many saw as having helped bringstability to Iraq, was called upon to do it again in Afghanistan. However,success has eluded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), whichhas been unableto translate operational progress into strategic success. A number oftriumphant obituaries for counterinsurgency have since emerged, as it becomesclear that the campaign in Afghanistan is failing to deliver on its promises.
There are five inter-related drivers of this cauldron ofdiscontent with COIN: First, the rise of counterinsurgency as a standardpractice in the U.S. military left skeptical American officers and institutionswho preferred emphasizing conventional capabilities (large-scale armoredwarfare, for instance) feeling disenfranchised. Second, the common narrative ofthe war in Iraq viewed (and somestill view) Gen. Petraeus as the hero who brought counterinsurgency (andsubsequently stability) to the country. This narrative alienated some officerswho had already been using some counterinsurgency methods effectively beforethe introduction of FM 3-24. Third, among the commentariat, the caustic domestic political divisions from thefirst phase of the Iraq War, divisions that were aggravated in the lead-up tothe Afghan "surge", remain unhealed. Fourth, the military officers and thinktank scholars who became most closely associated with COIN's rise developed apartially-deserved reputation for cliquishness, self-reference, and conceit.And finally, there has been a dearth of clarity on the goals of the Afghancampaign on the policy and strategy levels.
Col. Gian Gentile (who represents the first, second, andfinal strands of anti-counterinsurgency discontent) presents one of his standardarguments in "COINis Dead: U.S. Army Must Put Strategy Over Tactics." He argues the UnitedStates military has failed in Afghanistan and Iraq because it allowed afascination with the tactical and operational methods of COIN to supersedeimplementation of an actual strategy in those conflicts. In fact, looking atoperations in Iraq and Afghanistan for lessons is a fundamentally misguidedventure, he argues. Rather, we can only view our experiences of the lastdecade as lessons in failure and return to embracing our conventionalcapabilities.
Others are preoccupied with the political battles behind counterinsurgency.Michael Cohen, a vocal critic ofthe war in Afghanistan, refusesto acknowledge that counterinsurgency lessons are worth keeping andinstitutionalizing until advocates of the population-centric approach inAfghanistan "loudly acknowledge - indeed even shout to the hills - that everytime someone recommends fighting a counterinsurgency this is [a] really,really, really bad idea...." This seems akin to arguing that we cannot updateour doctrine on nuclear warfare, expeditionary warfare, and other capabilitiesthat are far more costly until we "shout to the hills" that to use these wouldbe a "really, really, really bad idea." Advocates of maintaining counterinsurgencycapabilities have been happyto acknowledgethese campaigns tendto be long, hard slogs, but Mr. Cohen's criticism does not address the military'sneed to be able to adapt to contingencies as ordered. We cannot wish away theagency of our enemies.
Still others see those who support counterinsurgency's place inthe toolbox of American power as being part of a new "military-industrialcomplex." Major Mike Few, an armor officer (like Colonel Gentile) and editor ofSmall Wars Journal, arguesthat some think tanks and defense contractors have formed a "cottage industry"that champions counterinsurgency for ego and profit at the cost of "trillionsof dollars, thousands of lives and abandoned security projects elsewhere thatcould have benefited our republic exponentially more..."
For one thing, theweaponssystems, equipment, and capabilities necessary for modern "conventional"campaigns are far more costly and more lucrative for defense contractors (the2009 defense industry-subsidized congressional debateabout the F-22 reminded the world that the original military-industrialcomplex is alive, well, and costing the U.S. taxpayer for over-budget,malfunctioning weapons systems of questionable utility). Further, the use ofconventional capabilities against a major power may well take more militarylives than those we have lost in Iraq andAfghanistan. But this aside, our abilities to conduct counterinsurgencyoperations and major combat operations are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, aspeople like Maj. Few understand, John Nagl's Centerfor a New American Security -- the unnamed bogeyman in his critique andothers -- did not decide to go to war in Iraq or Afghanistan. Nagl was merely oneof many in the U.S. Armed Forces who sought to make the campaigns of twoconsecutive Commanders-in-Chief work.
Indeed, the debate surrounding counterinsurgency has becomehighly personal, emotional, and angry. This has been most recently demonstratedby the snideand personalrejoindersto a recent articleteasing out the lessons of Iraq by Dr.David Ucko of the National Defense University. Increasingly for somecritics of counterinsurgency, their opponents are not just wrong, but immoralliars. Yet for all of the heat this debate, it has produced little substantivediscussion of the future of counterinsurgency after the wars in Iraq andAfghanistan, or more broadly the appropriate uses of limited funds andmanpower.
Before declaring the death of counterinsurgency and maligningthose who see value in some of its precepts, analysts should ask if insurgencyis dead. Indeed, the most significant failure of these anti-COIN arguments istheir shared focus on the response to a problem -- counterinsurgency tacticsand strategy -- at the expense of the problem itself. None of these articlesproclaim that "insurgency is dead" because to do so would be absurd. Insurgencylives, and has proven itself throughout history as the best means by which tooppose established political and military power. AsAndrew Exum recently observed, about 80 percent of all conflicts since theend of the Napoleonic Era have been insurgencies or civil wars. Futureinsurgencies are all-but-certain to challenge American interests to the pointthat our civilian political leadership will need to decide if our military willbecome involved in countering them. And if insurgency lives, then so must counterinsurgency.
Critics also make the mistake of particularizing a form of counterinsurgencydesigned during a specific historical period meant to counter a distinctiveform of insurgency known as popularprotracted warfare. If anything, the key failure of counterinsurgency inthe past decade has been the myopic view of the military and key counterinsurgencyproponents that counterinsurgency could only take the form advocated byscholar-practitioners like the French officer David Galula (who developed histheories in Asia before implementing them in Algeria) and the British officerSir Robert Thompson in Malaysia, who were both grappling with different, lessevolved forms of violent struggle than what we have seen in Iraq andAfghanistan. Thus, for critics to proclaim the death of counterinsurgencymakes them guilty of the same error that they often pin on their opponents: relyingon an expired intellectual framework.
The real question is: what form will American counterinsurgencytake in the future? It seems reasonable to argue that "big footprint," "population-centric"counterinsurgency is dead, but "small footprint" counterinsurgency that focuseson security force assistance, Special Operations, and/or foreign internaldefense lives on (see Yemen,the Philippines,and Somalia).But is it really inconceivable that we will ever again conduct another large-scalepopulation-centric counterinsurgency campaign? Those who think it impossible mightconsider how the United States would respond to violence spilling over theborder from catastrophic state failure and humanitarian crisis in Mexico, forinstance.
As always, our choices will be structured by the agency ofour competitors. Therefore, we would be foolish to avoid learning the tacticaland operational as well as the policyand strategic lessons of the last ten years. We must maintain our capabilities and competencies for counterinsurgency,if only because history has shown that they will come in handy again.
How we do this is what we mustdebate and discuss.
Ryan Evans is anassociate fellow at the International Centre for the Study ofRadicalisation and Political Violence and served in Helmand Province, Afghanistan as a Human Terrain TeamSocial Scientist. The views and opinions expressed here do not represent those of theDepartment of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, or the Human TerrainSystem.
AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP/Getty Images
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EXPLORE:AFPAK, AFPAK POSTER 2, AFGHANISTAN, AFPAK CHANNEL, AL QAEDA, IRAQ, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, SECURITY, TALIBAN, TERRORISM, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
EXPLORE:AFPAK, AFPAK POSTER 2, AFGHANISTAN, AFPAK CHANNEL, AL QAEDA, IRAQ, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, SECURITY, TALIBAN, TERRORISM, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY It remains amazing to me how complete debates of Counter-Insurgency, a tactic intended to bolster and protect a seated government of any nation from insurgencies, can be fully argued by military analysts with no mention whatsoever of the state of national, provincial and local governance, or any voices or consideration from the nation itself.
Where, on either side of this debate, is the foundation strategy and objective against which the merits of COIN can be measured?
Iraq was, initially, a limited exercise in regime replacement which, without planning, resourcing and intentionality, stumbled quickly into a nation-building exercise of which COIN was a part and parcel, coming, with substantial prior baggage, to the fore as a necessary precondition for exit AFTER governance, economic, cultural and security conditions deteriorated to a hair's breadth of catastrophe.
Reading a debate on COIN (Ryan's, Ucko's, Gentile's, Exum's or Nagl's) that is wholly contained within the military community of the external nation, and devoid of genuine context to the nation for which it was applied is a meaningless exercise.
Of course, COIN is a tactic used throughout history, and one which will never die. The question is: How applicable, useful, well-applied, etc..., is/was it in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc...?
This month is the anniversary of the start of Siege of Kut (1915-1916) during and after which 4,400 British Soldiers died following the hapless British Mesopotamian Campaign.
How was the US effort in Iraq (or Afghanistan) any different than the British Colonial Campaigns, right down to the delusional myths of Lawrence and Gertrude Bell in the romantic bedouin but feeble "infidel" culture which, in the end, had little relevance to actual Arab countries which, in their urban cores, were complex cultures of inter-generationally competing and cooperating masses of peoples with their own unique histories, religions, politics, and economic positions?
My read of mid-2008, from first hand involvements across ministries and provinces, was the emergence of Iraqi confidence in its ability to govern without US gun trucks in the middle of their street---as expressed in the 2008 SOFA. As with the British Occupancy, they just wanted to the foreigners out, and would deal with the serious results on their own.
That Iraqi change, expressed through its formally executed SOFA, is why General Austin "cased the colors" on December 15, 2011.
Where and how did COIN fit into that now-historical fact?
How did COIN support or drive Iraqi confidence in self-governance, positive and negative, as it probably did?
What legacies has COIN left that will impact Iraqi futures (including the "money as a weapon," and the Lawrence-inspired tribal reinforcement attributes) for better or for worse?
How does this whole COIN effort, for example, relate to Edward Wadie Said's entire "Orientalism" critique which has, within academia, haunted the US military's and "failed state/colonialist" parties' love affair with Lawrence and the "infidels" in need of what the US can bring to them?
This debate needs much more context, breadth and depth before it can be meaningfully analyzed.
Where, on either side of this debate, is the foundation strategy and objective against which the merits of COIN can be measured?
Iraq was, initially, a limited exercise in regime replacement which, without planning, resourcing and intentionality, stumbled quickly into a nation-building exercise of which COIN was a part and parcel, coming, with substantial prior baggage, to the fore as a necessary precondition for exit AFTER governance, economic, cultural and security conditions deteriorated to a hair's breadth of catastrophe.
Reading a debate on COIN (Ryan's, Ucko's, Gentile's, Exum's or Nagl's) that is wholly contained within the military community of the external nation, and devoid of genuine context to the nation for which it was applied is a meaningless exercise.
Of course, COIN is a tactic used throughout history, and one which will never die. The question is: How applicable, useful, well-applied, etc..., is/was it in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc...?
This month is the anniversary of the start of Siege of Kut (1915-1916) during and after which 4,400 British Soldiers died following the hapless British Mesopotamian Campaign.
How was the US effort in Iraq (or Afghanistan) any different than the British Colonial Campaigns, right down to the delusional myths of Lawrence and Gertrude Bell in the romantic bedouin but feeble "infidel" culture which, in the end, had little relevance to actual Arab countries which, in their urban cores, were complex cultures of inter-generationally competing and cooperating masses of peoples with their own unique histories, religions, politics, and economic positions?
My read of mid-2008, from first hand involvements across ministries and provinces, was the emergence of Iraqi confidence in its ability to govern without US gun trucks in the middle of their street---as expressed in the 2008 SOFA. As with the British Occupancy, they just wanted to the foreigners out, and would deal with the serious results on their own.
That Iraqi change, expressed through its formally executed SOFA, is why General Austin "cased the colors" on December 15, 2011.
Where and how did COIN fit into that now-historical fact?
How did COIN support or drive Iraqi confidence in self-governance, positive and negative, as it probably did?
What legacies has COIN left that will impact Iraqi futures (including the "money as a weapon," and the Lawrence-inspired tribal reinforcement attributes) for better or for worse?
How does this whole COIN effort, for example, relate to Edward Wadie Said's entire "Orientalism" critique which has, within academia, haunted the US military's and "failed state/colonialist" parties' love affair with Lawrence and the "infidels" in need of what the US can bring to them?
This debate needs much more context, breadth and depth before it can be meaningfully analyzed.
Steve,
Thank you for your comment and for reading the article. You may be encouraged to know I am working on an article on the specific context of Central Helmand Province and the limits of COIN operations there due to specific local political, historical, and economic circumstances.
Best,
Ryan
Thank you for your comment and for reading the article. You may be encouraged to know I am working on an article on the specific context of Central Helmand Province and the limits of COIN operations there due to specific local political, historical, and economic circumstances.
Best,
Ryan
Ryan:
For obvious reasons, well-researched and supported articles on COIN, applied to particular places and circumstances by people who were actually there doing it, always seem to be about "the limits of COIN" and the humility earned by the author during the exercise.
I look forward to such an article.
For obvious reasons, well-researched and supported articles on COIN, applied to particular places and circumstances by people who were actually there doing it, always seem to be about "the limits of COIN" and the humility earned by the author during the exercise.
I look forward to such an article.
Correct in so many ways. The problem that we had in Iraq was we were not partnered with anyone until we made the deal with the Sunni's. It got better, we routed AQ and all the other jihadists opposing stability. It will NEVER work in A-stan due to the many ethnic and tribal groups. The "country" will remain fractured, and the Talibs are not coming to any table no time no how.
I never said either ego or profit.
"Today, population-centric counterinsurgency has become a cottage industry that lines the pockets of think tanks and defense contractors who have vested financial and political interests in ensuring that these unproven theories are cemented into Army doctrine. At the same time, our country is facing massive fiscal restraints. As the COIN industry has grown, we’ve had to seriously consider handing out pink slips to many multi-tour combats troops as well as cutting back on benefits for retirees and veterans."
"Today, population-centric counterinsurgency has become a cottage industry that lines the pockets of think tanks and defense contractors who have vested financial and political interests in ensuring that these unproven theories are cemented into Army doctrine. At the same time, our country is facing massive fiscal restraints. As the COIN industry has grown, we’ve had to seriously consider handing out pink slips to many multi-tour combats troops as well as cutting back on benefits for retirees and veterans."
Sorry, Mike.
I neglected to mention your substantial critiques in my listing of COIN debaters.
I have always been more interested in your initial comments about the lack of homework, the genuine background, intelligence and research, that is lacking in support of the effort.
Without foundation, of course, the effort becomes unmeasurable---with substantial domestic budget ramifications. How do you know who, what, when, where or How Much?
The important and effective military parts I saw in Iraq were those non-Coin ones, of McCrystal's snipers, and lots and lots of patrolling, bad guy chasing, and route clearance and protection (the regular military efforts), for which a separate analysis of its contributions are warranted.
PS: I saw no rose petals on the way in or the way out. Isn't a successful COIN effort measured by the love and respect engendered with the people of the host nation? Militarily, on the other hand, the US did what it was tasked to do.
I neglected to mention your substantial critiques in my listing of COIN debaters.
I have always been more interested in your initial comments about the lack of homework, the genuine background, intelligence and research, that is lacking in support of the effort.
Without foundation, of course, the effort becomes unmeasurable---with substantial domestic budget ramifications. How do you know who, what, when, where or How Much?
The important and effective military parts I saw in Iraq were those non-Coin ones, of McCrystal's snipers, and lots and lots of patrolling, bad guy chasing, and route clearance and protection (the regular military efforts), for which a separate analysis of its contributions are warranted.
PS: I saw no rose petals on the way in or the way out. Isn't a successful COIN effort measured by the love and respect engendered with the people of the host nation? Militarily, on the other hand, the US did what it was tasked to do.
My comment was for the author. He's misquoting me here as he did in the comments section of my article at Carl Prine's Line of Departure. Speaking of ego's, the author is a former HTT guy. Doesn't the Af-Pak channel know that he might have an ax to grind?
I am neither for or against COIN. I just want us to talk openly about it and fully understand what it is and what it isn't.
I am neither for or against COIN. I just want us to talk openly about it and fully understand what it is and what it isn't.
Mike:
I think that is the point. COIN is a basic tactic, arguably used since Alexander's time and before, by which local populations are controlled, coerced, co-opted, pacified or protected. It is not a thing to be for or against, and will always have validity under certain circumstances.
Your separate point about the HTT folks is, to me, as interesting as the discussion about COIN.
Assuming these folks had an accurate bead on things, they should have been deeply immersed in the social/societal background and context needed to effect substantial changes at the strategic level.
What serious purpose is there in having an anthropologist peering out the muddy window of a HumVee to advise on ground-level phenomenon, but devoid of a valid bigger picture?
Despite having seen some very good work product from some HTT folks, that program, as applied, warrants its own discrete analysis (and not just within the five walls of the Pentagon.
I think that is the point. COIN is a basic tactic, arguably used since Alexander's time and before, by which local populations are controlled, coerced, co-opted, pacified or protected. It is not a thing to be for or against, and will always have validity under certain circumstances.
Your separate point about the HTT folks is, to me, as interesting as the discussion about COIN.
Assuming these folks had an accurate bead on things, they should have been deeply immersed in the social/societal background and context needed to effect substantial changes at the strategic level.
What serious purpose is there in having an anthropologist peering out the muddy window of a HumVee to advise on ground-level phenomenon, but devoid of a valid bigger picture?
Despite having seen some very good work product from some HTT folks, that program, as applied, warrants its own discrete analysis (and not just within the five walls of the Pentagon.
Spot on. I'm just glad the discussion is happening again. I find it funny when people that don't know me try to corner me into one side or the other. It's also funny that the author labels me as an armor officer without knowing my full background. By the way, he never asked :).
But, what the military is going to have to figure out is if they are going to call COIN a strategy or not. A more senior officer the other day was referring to COIN as a method with it's own separate doctine, tactics, and strategy. That has implications. Better yet, and I continue to ask with no replies--- On the company and platoon level, with the exception of implementation of new technology, what exactly is "new" that was not included in the old tank platoon, infantry platoon, scout platoon, or special forces manual?
But, what the military is going to have to figure out is if they are going to call COIN a strategy or not. A more senior officer the other day was referring to COIN as a method with it's own separate doctine, tactics, and strategy. That has implications. Better yet, and I continue to ask with no replies--- On the company and platoon level, with the exception of implementation of new technology, what exactly is "new" that was not included in the old tank platoon, infantry platoon, scout platoon, or special forces manual?
Armor?
Oh, that's right. I was a sergeant/tank commander back in the black boot days. (3/64 Armor, 3ID)
Down the street in 2/64 Armor was young LT, now LTG Mark Hertling, who I had the opportunity to work with in Northern Iraq (2007/2008, 1AD/MND-North).
Didn't seem to know or care much about COIN, but he was exactly the right combination of soldier/diplomat to make a difference. He and his staff knew a lot about Iraq on many levels from multiple deployments, including to avoid too much money as a weapon (CERP efforts), and to focus Iraqis on their own way forward.
His personal stand-off between the Peshmerga and Iraqi Army in Diyala in September 2008 is the stuff of legend.
The good thing about Armor, I guess, is learning the terrain, and how to maneuver in it without getting stuck.
Oh, that's right. I was a sergeant/tank commander back in the black boot days. (3/64 Armor, 3ID)
Down the street in 2/64 Armor was young LT, now LTG Mark Hertling, who I had the opportunity to work with in Northern Iraq (2007/2008, 1AD/MND-North).
Didn't seem to know or care much about COIN, but he was exactly the right combination of soldier/diplomat to make a difference. He and his staff knew a lot about Iraq on many levels from multiple deployments, including to avoid too much money as a weapon (CERP efforts), and to focus Iraqis on their own way forward.
His personal stand-off between the Peshmerga and Iraqi Army in Diyala in September 2008 is the stuff of legend.
The good thing about Armor, I guess, is learning the terrain, and how to maneuver in it without getting stuck.
Major Few,
All of my quotations of your post are correct. And my characterization of your arguments (for ego and profit) are also accurate. Quoting your LoD post:
1) "population-centric counterinsurgency has become a cottage industry that lines the pockets of think tanks and defense contractors" = For profit
2) "To flatter intellectually the theories of a few, we’ve had to sacrifice..." = For ego
If you did not intend to argue that ego or profit are driving this "cottage industry," I apologize.
I'm not sure what pro- or anti-COIN biases my HTT experience would have left me with (if anything, it would be anti-, and you can listen to me talk here about that: http://icsr.info/seminar/counter-insurgency-in-helmand-and-beyond), but I'd appreciate any further comments you have that engage with the substance of my arguments rather than accusations of bias. A tendency to attack the analyst rather than his arguments is one of the problems of the COIN debate I point to in my article.
If you are for an open conversation about COIN, what it is, and what it isn't, we are in 100% agreement.
Best,
Ryan
All of my quotations of your post are correct. And my characterization of your arguments (for ego and profit) are also accurate. Quoting your LoD post:
1) "population-centric counterinsurgency has become a cottage industry that lines the pockets of think tanks and defense contractors" = For profit
2) "To flatter intellectually the theories of a few, we’ve had to sacrifice..." = For ego
If you did not intend to argue that ego or profit are driving this "cottage industry," I apologize.
I'm not sure what pro- or anti-COIN biases my HTT experience would have left me with (if anything, it would be anti-, and you can listen to me talk here about that: http://icsr.info/seminar/counter-insurgency-in-helmand-and-beyond), but I'd appreciate any further comments you have that engage with the substance of my arguments rather than accusations of bias. A tendency to attack the analyst rather than his arguments is one of the problems of the COIN debate I point to in my article.
If you are for an open conversation about COIN, what it is, and what it isn't, we are in 100% agreement.
Best,
Ryan
Ryan, what does the whole sentence say?
Ryan, you speak of context, but you took a sentence fragment out of my article that had nothing to do with either the full context of the sentence or the intent of the article.
I quote the rest of it in my article. :) So now we have the whole thing. But for your benefit:
"To flatter intellectually the theories of a few, we’ve had to sacrifice trillions of dollars, thousands of lives and abandoned security projects elsewhere that could have benefited our republic exponentially more than what we’ve garnered during a generation-long struggle in the Middle East and South Asia."
Read more: http://www.lineofdeparture.com/2011/12/12/is-coin-too-big-to-fail/#ixzz1gj33WnZP
"To flatter intellectually the theories of a few, we’ve had to sacrifice trillions of dollars, thousands of lives and abandoned security projects elsewhere that could have benefited our republic exponentially more than what we’ve garnered during a generation-long struggle in the Middle East and South Asia."
Read more: http://www.lineofdeparture.com/2011/12/12/is-coin-too-big-to-fail/#ixzz1gj33WnZP
amazing how you leave out the important part
Bottom line is you rushed to judgement. You can either fix your error now or live with it. If you want to get to know my extensive background and writing on COIN, then please feel free to visit Small Wars Journal.
I will have to respectfully disagree as I think I interpreted your comments accurately. But I appreciate your input.
I am happy that there is critical discussion of it all now, and folks who are coin advocates are feeling the need to defend it. Three years ago when we really needed to have this discussion it didnt happen since all there was at time was the FM 3-24 matrix, super charged by the surge triumph narrative. Nobody really questioned Coin critically then, which is partially why we ended up taking the foolish approach to trying to do Surge 2 in Afghanistan.
Prine's criticism of Ucko was spot on correct. Sure it was full of Prine-isms and sarcasm, but that is just how he rolls, and there were no "personal attacks" in it as you say.
Lastly since you mentioned Galula please do consider the fact that Galula, when he applied his 8 methods in Algeria (contrary to what he says in his book) actually FAILED at most of them. This argument is made in a new book by French researcher Gregor Mathias. The book is based on primary source evidence. So this thing we call American Coin as codified in FM 3-24, of which its writers have frequently acknowledged that it was influenced heavily by Galula's book and senior generals like McChrystal publicly noted that it was on his bed stand to read every night, is based on an operational method that failed.
Prine's criticism of Ucko was spot on correct. Sure it was full of Prine-isms and sarcasm, but that is just how he rolls, and there were no "personal attacks" in it as you say.
Lastly since you mentioned Galula please do consider the fact that Galula, when he applied his 8 methods in Algeria (contrary to what he says in his book) actually FAILED at most of them. This argument is made in a new book by French researcher Gregor Mathias. The book is based on primary source evidence. So this thing we call American Coin as codified in FM 3-24, of which its writers have frequently acknowledged that it was influenced heavily by Galula's book and senior generals like McChrystal publicly noted that it was on his bed stand to read every night, is based on an operational method that failed.
COL Gentile: I am critical of the over-reliance on Galula in my article. Thank you for your comments and Mathias' book is on my shelf waiting to be cracked open.
Gian:
Just as Lawrence and Gertrude Bell's efforts to insert the bedouin prince Faisal did not work well.
Steve
Just as Lawrence and Gertrude Bell's efforts to insert the bedouin prince Faisal did not work well.
Steve
Ryan,
We're still trying to figure this stuff out. Outside of implementing new technology, what are these COIN lessons learned? Can you name one on the ground level?
We're still trying to figure this stuff out. Outside of implementing new technology, what are these COIN lessons learned? Can you name one on the ground level?
There are a few I am writing about now (in draft form), but just to name a few interrelated issues: The structure of ISAF precludes those confronted most directly with underlying causes of violence from not just addressing these causes, but having any meaningful input up the chain on how to address them. We are great at addressing symptoms, but not the actual problems. In Helmand, these include land tenure disputes, the systemic incentives of the narcotics trade, enduring mujahideen factional disputes...These are all political issue and we always talk about how COIN is 80% political, but we do not get involved in any of these political issues in a meaningful way, nor do we seriously seek to nudge the Afghan government (which we fund) in the right direction on any of these issues... This is an old lesson IDENTIFIED, but not a lesson LEARNED.
I would not address 1. international peacekeeping structure issues, 2. Afghanistan drug trade, or 3. Tribal factions disputes (political issues) as COIN issues. Nothing there falls solely in the realm of so-called COIN.
So, again, what's new here?
So, again, what's new here?
You'll all just have to wait until my next article comes out...but thank you for engaging!
These three issues, which you would not include, are some key issues that do need to be addressed in the context of Afghanistan. It appears that you are addressing COIN separately from the context in which it is currently being attempted. That discussion is valid, but it appears that you and the author are talking past each other.
I would disagree with you on the issue of political issues as being in the realm of COIN, since an insurgency is at its core a struggle for political power. In fact, one of the key failures of implementing COIN in Afghanistan, other than in discrete areas, is the near-total failure to engage in improving governance. Even if we separate the issue of COIN from Afghanistan in particular, COIN requires an approach that cannot rely solely on the military. As such, the discussion of the inability to engage in political solutions (again, other than in discrete successes by individual units and/or commanders) remains a failure mode that we keep defaulting to. This is a COIN issue, not just an Afghanistan issue.
It matters not if the locale is Afghanistan or any other; the failure to meaningfully engage in resolving the political drivers of conflict/instability will have poor results for a counterinsurgent.
Unfortunately, this is not the only area in which American counterinsurgents rather consistently fail. Some of the failures are due to systemic separations and distrust amongst our own institutions. There are other systemic behaviors which inhibit the ability to conduct effective COIN/stability operations. Our inability to adapt to circumstances and convert a political imperative into a developed strategy and a clearly understood commander's intent and desired end state, work together with other institutions and work towards a common goal, similar to the dysfunctional structure of ISAF, is an issue that must be addressed in future discussions of COIN as well.
Since the military cannot succeed at COIN by itself, and unity of effort is necessary, a methodology for establishing that unity of effort in the absence of unity of command is needed. The demonstrated inability of most American military officers to work well with the officers of other arms of our government indicates a disabling weakness that will haunt any future efforts. So perhaps a look at the dysfunction of Afghanistan's framework for application would indeed be appropriate.
I would disagree with you on the issue of political issues as being in the realm of COIN, since an insurgency is at its core a struggle for political power. In fact, one of the key failures of implementing COIN in Afghanistan, other than in discrete areas, is the near-total failure to engage in improving governance. Even if we separate the issue of COIN from Afghanistan in particular, COIN requires an approach that cannot rely solely on the military. As such, the discussion of the inability to engage in political solutions (again, other than in discrete successes by individual units and/or commanders) remains a failure mode that we keep defaulting to. This is a COIN issue, not just an Afghanistan issue.
It matters not if the locale is Afghanistan or any other; the failure to meaningfully engage in resolving the political drivers of conflict/instability will have poor results for a counterinsurgent.
Unfortunately, this is not the only area in which American counterinsurgents rather consistently fail. Some of the failures are due to systemic separations and distrust amongst our own institutions. There are other systemic behaviors which inhibit the ability to conduct effective COIN/stability operations. Our inability to adapt to circumstances and convert a political imperative into a developed strategy and a clearly understood commander's intent and desired end state, work together with other institutions and work towards a common goal, similar to the dysfunctional structure of ISAF, is an issue that must be addressed in future discussions of COIN as well.
Since the military cannot succeed at COIN by itself, and unity of effort is necessary, a methodology for establishing that unity of effort in the absence of unity of command is needed. The demonstrated inability of most American military officers to work well with the officers of other arms of our government indicates a disabling weakness that will haunt any future efforts. So perhaps a look at the dysfunction of Afghanistan's framework for application would indeed be appropriate.
Ryan:
Now we are back to the substantial limits of US COIN as applied.
Mostly political/domestic issues, but not in the military's bailiwick. The military in Iraq did what it could, but too often piecemeal and out-of-context. Afghanistan? The same.
During British control of Iraq, Gertie and Winnie (along with Bomber Harris) found those pesky Kurds to be a bothersome disturbance to their man Faisal.
Costs (British blood and treasure) dictated the best military method was an air campaign: machine guns and chemical bombs. In the end, these were strong motivators to route Faisal and the British.
Same limitations for the US?
Now we are back to the substantial limits of US COIN as applied.
Mostly political/domestic issues, but not in the military's bailiwick. The military in Iraq did what it could, but too often piecemeal and out-of-context. Afghanistan? The same.
During British control of Iraq, Gertie and Winnie (along with Bomber Harris) found those pesky Kurds to be a bothersome disturbance to their man Faisal.
Costs (British blood and treasure) dictated the best military method was an air campaign: machine guns and chemical bombs. In the end, these were strong motivators to route Faisal and the British.
Same limitations for the US?
Ryan:
Then if you are critical of the over reliance on Galula, then in turn you should be quite critical of FM 3-24 since it is largely a rehash of Galula. I mean think about it, we have a text (Galula's book) which has come to be seen in almost canonic form within the American army over the past three years (pundits like Ricks and Nagl promoted it endlessly, McChrystal says it is on his bedstand at night, at the Coin Academy in Taji in Dec 05 when I attended the course was basically Galula 101, people like Doug Ollivant after their tours in Iraq come back and write articles on how they did Galula in Iraq) yet the text of Galula was never understood in its context, and the context that surrounded Galula shows that he failed. So our entire Coin doctrine is based on a method that did not work in the first place.
Dont as an analyst you see a problem with this?
gian
Then if you are critical of the over reliance on Galula, then in turn you should be quite critical of FM 3-24 since it is largely a rehash of Galula. I mean think about it, we have a text (Galula's book) which has come to be seen in almost canonic form within the American army over the past three years (pundits like Ricks and Nagl promoted it endlessly, McChrystal says it is on his bedstand at night, at the Coin Academy in Taji in Dec 05 when I attended the course was basically Galula 101, people like Doug Ollivant after their tours in Iraq come back and write articles on how they did Galula in Iraq) yet the text of Galula was never understood in its context, and the context that surrounded Galula shows that he failed. So our entire Coin doctrine is based on a method that did not work in the first place.
Dont as an analyst you see a problem with this?
gian
Gian,
I think if you take another look at my article, you'll see that I am critical of the FM 3-24 framework, but FM 3-24 only offers one conceptualization of what COIN is. It is not the final word on COIN, as I think you will agree.
These disagreements are not quite so black and white. For example, David Ucko, who you have devoted a lot of typing to criticizing lately, wrote the forward to the Mathius book you recommend on Galula.
Best,
Ryan
I think if you take another look at my article, you'll see that I am critical of the FM 3-24 framework, but FM 3-24 only offers one conceptualization of what COIN is. It is not the final word on COIN, as I think you will agree.
These disagreements are not quite so black and white. For example, David Ucko, who you have devoted a lot of typing to criticizing lately, wrote the forward to the Mathius book you recommend on Galula.
Best,
Ryan
Sir, one book says that Galula's attempt of his principles in Algeria failed. As an analyst, don't you see a problem with that?
One book says that 8-10 CAV made a poor showing in Baghdad in 2006. I know you've got a problem with that.
One book invalidates Galula, and that's definitive. One book invalidates 8-10 CAV in the pre-surge, and that is arguable. The metrics are broken, and there is a problem with that. Either one book is enough or not. In short, cherry-picking when one book is definitive and when one book is not definitive is a roll of the dice. It all depends on when that book agrees with one's personal opinion, doesn't it?
One book says that 8-10 CAV made a poor showing in Baghdad in 2006. I know you've got a problem with that.
One book invalidates Galula, and that's definitive. One book invalidates 8-10 CAV in the pre-surge, and that is arguable. The metrics are broken, and there is a problem with that. Either one book is enough or not. In short, cherry-picking when one book is definitive and when one book is not definitive is a roll of the dice. It all depends on when that book agrees with one's personal opinion, doesn't it?
Ryan:
Before jumping into international efforts, you would do well to read the frightfully accurate "Chasing the Flame," Samantha Powers' book on UN SRSG Sergio De Mello.
It accurately depicts a group of often very dedicated UN people working in an organization with very serious structural political limitations.
The Wiki Cables on disputed boundaries issues, for example, describes the substantial 2008 external (NY) pressures against UN staff going forward with disputed boundaries resolutions.
Today, the Kurds believe they were "sold out" by the UN, which is, in fact, an over-simplification of the substantial limitations on that organization, and its otherwise highly motivated folks.
Too, often, US military analysts simply point to some other US or international organization as a culprit, or responsible party, and move on with their own opinions. Reality is much more complex, recognizing, as Powers does, the real limitations of these organizations. (Re: Ucko's comment: the civilian effort in Afghanistan was never up to the task....)
Before jumping into international efforts, you would do well to read the frightfully accurate "Chasing the Flame," Samantha Powers' book on UN SRSG Sergio De Mello.
It accurately depicts a group of often very dedicated UN people working in an organization with very serious structural political limitations.
The Wiki Cables on disputed boundaries issues, for example, describes the substantial 2008 external (NY) pressures against UN staff going forward with disputed boundaries resolutions.
Today, the Kurds believe they were "sold out" by the UN, which is, in fact, an over-simplification of the substantial limitations on that organization, and its otherwise highly motivated folks.
Too, often, US military analysts simply point to some other US or international organization as a culprit, or responsible party, and move on with their own opinions. Reality is much more complex, recognizing, as Powers does, the real limitations of these organizations. (Re: Ucko's comment: the civilian effort in Afghanistan was never up to the task....)
So Ryan,
If COIN is not Galula and not FM 3-24, what is COIN. You seem to claim that it can't die, so what is it?
If COIN is not Galula and not FM 3-24, what is COIN. You seem to claim that it can't die, so what is it?
It was the wrong forward to what is otherwise an exceptionally good book. Ucko wants to salvage the reputation of Galula when based on the book itself, that kind of argument just doesnt make sense.
What the Forward should have highlighted is what i pointed out above; that the American Army based its coin doctrine on a text, but without a contextual understanding of Galula and his failed operations.
What the Forward should have highlighted is what i pointed out above; that the American Army based its coin doctrine on a text, but without a contextual understanding of Galula and his failed operations.
The nature of combat operations in conventonal war varies less at the lower echelons of command, and increases the higher one goes. The adaptation of one form of war versus others was always built into the Army's order of battle refined after the Lousiana Maneuvers. video to iMovie
Gian: I'm just shocked that you did not like the foreword. Man, I just can't do anything right... Still, at least the author was happy with it. And I rather liked it too.
But then I am a COIN pamphleteer. Which explains how I concluded it:
"All of this – Galula’s mixed record and his tentativeness in proposing his concept – should instill a much-needed measure of humility about what is possible in counterinsurgency operations, and through military intervention writ large. For this very reason, it is incumbent on those militaries with expeditionary ambitions to study the history of their intellectual forefathers, to learn from their experiences, and try not to repeat their mistakes."
Complete rubbish, right??
But then I am a COIN pamphleteer. Which explains how I concluded it:
"All of this – Galula’s mixed record and his tentativeness in proposing his concept – should instill a much-needed measure of humility about what is possible in counterinsurgency operations, and through military intervention writ large. For this very reason, it is incumbent on those militaries with expeditionary ambitions to study the history of their intellectual forefathers, to learn from their experiences, and try not to repeat their mistakes."
Complete rubbish, right??
Ryan and co,
A few points
1) Thanks for writing this very important article. I've been following the COIN debate closely. I'm now in graduate school after a tour in Iraq, and it has concerned me immensely that the military might respond to our strategic failure in Iraq (and likely failure in Afghanistan), by merely deciding that we don't want to fight these kinds of wars anymore.
That, to me, doesn't seem to be an option, because our enemies have a say. It seems logical to me that we will face a series of threats that at least partially resemble insurgency, or have an insurgency element within them. For example I think long term strategic competition with China is likely to involve a mix of insurgency, cyberwar, and conventional war (if not the whole spectrum of conflict).
2) I've been equally concerned that we might come away from these conflicts thinking that we have institutionalized a strong counterinsurgency capability. I think most of the US Army, but not all, UNDERSTAND counterinsurgency, but that doesn't mean that we have actually learned how to implement good counterinsurgency operations.
I think some of Colonel Gentile's writing is correct, COIN has been part of a larger strategic failure. But insurgency is not dead. To draw upon an analogy familiar to the US Army, Germany had a terrible Grand Strategy for both WWI and WWII, but they produced some amazing operational and tactical advances. I think we need to be careful to develop on our operational successes with COIN, and learn how to enhance it, without throwing out COIN all together just because these wars have been, to a degree, strategic failures.
3) I appreciate the tone of the article and the comments that follow. That you and Colonel Gentile can have a productive discussion (which I am learning from), speaks volumes to the tone and intent of the article. An open productive discussion about COIN is absolutely needed and it needs to be as little about personalities as possible.
A few points
1) Thanks for writing this very important article. I've been following the COIN debate closely. I'm now in graduate school after a tour in Iraq, and it has concerned me immensely that the military might respond to our strategic failure in Iraq (and likely failure in Afghanistan), by merely deciding that we don't want to fight these kinds of wars anymore.
That, to me, doesn't seem to be an option, because our enemies have a say. It seems logical to me that we will face a series of threats that at least partially resemble insurgency, or have an insurgency element within them. For example I think long term strategic competition with China is likely to involve a mix of insurgency, cyberwar, and conventional war (if not the whole spectrum of conflict).
2) I've been equally concerned that we might come away from these conflicts thinking that we have institutionalized a strong counterinsurgency capability. I think most of the US Army, but not all, UNDERSTAND counterinsurgency, but that doesn't mean that we have actually learned how to implement good counterinsurgency operations.
I think some of Colonel Gentile's writing is correct, COIN has been part of a larger strategic failure. But insurgency is not dead. To draw upon an analogy familiar to the US Army, Germany had a terrible Grand Strategy for both WWI and WWII, but they produced some amazing operational and tactical advances. I think we need to be careful to develop on our operational successes with COIN, and learn how to enhance it, without throwing out COIN all together just because these wars have been, to a degree, strategic failures.
3) I appreciate the tone of the article and the comments that follow. That you and Colonel Gentile can have a productive discussion (which I am learning from), speaks volumes to the tone and intent of the article. An open productive discussion about COIN is absolutely needed and it needs to be as little about personalities as possible.
Thank you for your comment. Food for thought!
COIN is based on hiring one set of local thugs (beautifully named 'awakening') to kill the other set.
So COIN dies when the payroll stops and first set is fired while second set was never totally vanquished.
So COIN dies when the payroll stops and first set is fired while second set was never totally vanquished.
Gian P. Gentile, Paul Olsen, and others are debating over whether counterinsurgency is dead. Elsewhere, Colin Clark reports that COIN is being “scrapped” by the military. Gentile and Douglas Ollivant has written about the formation of a dominant COIN narrative, and it’s clear that at for a combination of material, academic, and political reasons this narrative is no longer dominant. But is COIN dead? In suspended animation? Some quick thoughts as I continue to hack away at the information warfare and deception research project…
First, it is a bit too soon for us to hail or mourn the death of COIN. What this represents is the end of COIN as practiced and theorized by elements within the Army and Marine Corps from 2006-2010, just as the Kennedy-era idea of counterinsurgency within elements of the US defense establishment died with Vietnam. The United States has faced insurgencies, terrorists, armed rebellions, guerrillas, partisans, and irregular raiding forces since the early days of colonization. It will continue to do so in the near future as long as American allies, clients, and proxies face irregular threats, although the shape of the response will vary.
Second, COIN, for all of the heat and noise about it, is still rather poorly understood in Iraq and Afghanistan. So much of the debate is weighted down with external baggage, mainly because it was never entirely about Iraq or Afghanistan. Rather, the COIN debate was often a proxy for many different political, professional, interdepartmental, and other battles within the United States political and defense establishments. Ollivant’s paper, and newer research highlights significant uncertainty to cause and effect in both sides of the COIN debate that will likely not be definitely settled soon.
Most importantly, it is important not to replace one orthodoxy for another. The emerging consensus of drones, special forces, and Asia has its own flaws which need their own airing.
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theory strategy
DISQUS...
@Simlaughter
Sina Weibo, among others, heavily restricted: http://t.co/cocLGKQs
@Winterpool There's been other mathematical looks at war, but all of them are very problematic
@steven_metz I'm sad that reality tv ppl are celebrities to begin with. Even the most vapid actor/actress still works to be vapid
"In Soviet Russia" jokes in 1, 2, 3... http://t.co/WUf1Rgl3
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First, it is a bit too soon for us to hail or mourn the death of COIN. What this represents is the end of COIN as practiced and theorized by elements within the Army and Marine Corps from 2006-2010, just as the Kennedy-era idea of counterinsurgency within elements of the US defense establishment died with Vietnam. The United States has faced insurgencies, terrorists, armed rebellions, guerrillas, partisans, and irregular raiding forces since the early days of colonization. It will continue to do so in the near future as long as American allies, clients, and proxies face irregular threats, although the shape of the response will vary.
Second, COIN, for all of the heat and noise about it, is still rather poorly understood in Iraq and Afghanistan. So much of the debate is weighted down with external baggage, mainly because it was never entirely about Iraq or Afghanistan. Rather, the COIN debate was often a proxy for many different political, professional, interdepartmental, and other battles within the United States political and defense establishments. Ollivant’s paper, and newer research highlights significant uncertainty to cause and effect in both sides of the COIN debate that will likely not be definitely settled soon.
Most importantly, it is important not to replace one orthodoxy for another. The emerging consensus of drones, special forces, and Asia has its own flaws which need their own airing.
0 Comments and 0 Reactions
theory strategy
DISQUS...
@Simlaughter
Sina Weibo, among others, heavily restricted: http://t.co/cocLGKQs
@Winterpool There's been other mathematical looks at war, but all of them are very problematic
@steven_metz I'm sad that reality tv ppl are celebrities to begin with. Even the most vapid actor/actress still works to be vapid
"In Soviet Russia" jokes in 1, 2, 3... http://t.co/WUf1Rgl3
A blog on states, communities, and organizations in conflict by Adam Elkus.
Portrait photo: Marshal Liu "One-Eyed Dragon" Boacheng
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The core curriculum that came out of Vietnam was packaged as Stability Operations the substance of which carried on in the Petraeus FM. The foundation of FM 23-4 is presuming that a given political entity (nation) has been already destabilized by insurgents, hence step by step the insurgents are suppressed and the necessary nation repairing is done.
The concept of fixing up a shot up country is not the same as nation building. One assumes a nation exists in some form acceptable to the citrizenry. Nation building starts with no nation and builds from there. The steps may look alike on papar, as building a nation whee none was before has a short shelf life.
Iraq has a concept of nation hood a few millenia long, and calling those who fought against the Coallition occupation authority created by an invasion did not create a credible replacement for Saddam. Any such regime we built fits the same model as what the Japanese and Germans did in WW2. We called them puppet regimes of no legitimacy,
The irony of that is that Indonesia and Burma were built on a military framwork trained by Japan, although with no love lost over Japan.
I don't think we have a good word to use in describing patriots fighting to get their own country back, and I don't ascribe any buzz to the patriot word. The psychology of a patriot counter movement is more clearly defined than an insurgency who efforts are destabilitzation.
In this regard, the Taliban plays the patriot card, and Al Qaeda are the insurgents. The Taliban was dragged into this war for refusing to out Osama bin Ladin in a most insulting way, Insulting Afghans is not considered good form.
The basic problem of defining the next war is that nothing is new under the sun, and Murphy holds the cards. The nature of combat operations in conventonal war varies less at the lower echelons of command, and increases the higher one goes. The adaptation of one form of war versus others was always built into the Army's order of battle refined after the Lousiana Maneuvers. There were two kinds of battalions: divisional and non divisional. Corps and higher were just headquarters companies.
The destruction of that battle tested order of battle in Transformation which ignores any variation in conditions of MET-TC. The concept is so ludicrous in battle that no one really pays attention to it. The adaptiveness of the US soldier adaptd and has been more effective in task organization than ever before.
The trouble for the future is that no cohesive structure for contingency operations above brigade is chaotic and dependant on civil servants and contractors like it was done in the 1600's (Sixteen hundreds). This can be fixed with a simple swearing in ceremony.
The codification of types of war needs review but fundamenally needs to be cranked into the culture of the parties inovlved on all sides. A deal that is not acceptable to the defeated means anotther war.
The concept of fixing up a shot up country is not the same as nation building. One assumes a nation exists in some form acceptable to the citrizenry. Nation building starts with no nation and builds from there. The steps may look alike on papar, as building a nation whee none was before has a short shelf life.
Iraq has a concept of nation hood a few millenia long, and calling those who fought against the Coallition occupation authority created by an invasion did not create a credible replacement for Saddam. Any such regime we built fits the same model as what the Japanese and Germans did in WW2. We called them puppet regimes of no legitimacy,
The irony of that is that Indonesia and Burma were built on a military framwork trained by Japan, although with no love lost over Japan.
I don't think we have a good word to use in describing patriots fighting to get their own country back, and I don't ascribe any buzz to the patriot word. The psychology of a patriot counter movement is more clearly defined than an insurgency who efforts are destabilitzation.
In this regard, the Taliban plays the patriot card, and Al Qaeda are the insurgents. The Taliban was dragged into this war for refusing to out Osama bin Ladin in a most insulting way, Insulting Afghans is not considered good form.
The basic problem of defining the next war is that nothing is new under the sun, and Murphy holds the cards. The nature of combat operations in conventonal war varies less at the lower echelons of command, and increases the higher one goes. The adaptation of one form of war versus others was always built into the Army's order of battle refined after the Lousiana Maneuvers. There were two kinds of battalions: divisional and non divisional. Corps and higher were just headquarters companies.
The destruction of that battle tested order of battle in Transformation which ignores any variation in conditions of MET-TC. The concept is so ludicrous in battle that no one really pays attention to it. The adaptiveness of the US soldier adaptd and has been more effective in task organization than ever before.
The trouble for the future is that no cohesive structure for contingency operations above brigade is chaotic and dependant on civil servants and contractors like it was done in the 1600's (Sixteen hundreds). This can be fixed with a simple swearing in ceremony.
The codification of types of war needs review but fundamenally needs to be cranked into the culture of the parties inovlved on all sides. A deal that is not acceptable to the defeated means anotther war.
Here is an oped of mine published in the Des Moines (Iowa) Register. Not sure if it fits this discussion but my sense is that it does.........
Right Force, WrongLeaders For Afghanistan
When asked about forms ofgovernment, Winston Churchill famously remarked, “democracy is the worst formof government, except for all the others”. I would use Churchill’s observation in another manner: the U.S. Department of Defense is the worstof all groups at practicing stability operations, except for all the others. Itis time to operationalize this observation by putting the right set of militaryleaders in the drivers seat.
The wrong branch of the military isleading stability operations in Afghanistan. The largest part of stabilityoperations is essentially a distribution network that provides goods (bridgerepair, school construction) and services (mentoring of government workers,monitoring of performance, creating transparent legal and financialnetworks). Stability operations willonly fully succeed when U.S. Department of State and other non-lethal decisionmakers are able to authoritatively direct the significant assets that the U.S.Department of Defense brings to the table.
Like most of us, combat armscommanders are slaves to their own background, training and, most importantly,their performance evaluations. Combatarms commanders are rewarded for the conduct of combat operations. Asking themto do anything else is unfair to them. Puttingcombat arms officers in charge of stability operations is the wrong use of anotherwise excellent tool.
The “right set” of militaryleadership should be sourced from other branches of the military. Combatcommanders and casual observers of events in Afghanistan (and other places)will violently object to this proposition, citing the chimera of “security” asthe most important piece of the stability operations puzzle, and they are notwrong. It’s just that combat commandersare the wrong leaders for the operation as a whole.
There is a place for the militarycombat commander, and that place is the conduct of combat operations. And until we put the right type of commanderin charge of stability operations, we will continue to reward ourselves with marginaland unsustainable gains.
-30-
I welcome your comments. tom
Right Force, WrongLeaders For Afghanistan
When asked about forms ofgovernment, Winston Churchill famously remarked, “democracy is the worst formof government, except for all the others”. I would use Churchill’s observation in another manner: the U.S. Department of Defense is the worstof all groups at practicing stability operations, except for all the others. Itis time to operationalize this observation by putting the right set of militaryleaders in the drivers seat.
The wrong branch of the military isleading stability operations in Afghanistan. The largest part of stabilityoperations is essentially a distribution network that provides goods (bridgerepair, school construction) and services (mentoring of government workers,monitoring of performance, creating transparent legal and financialnetworks). Stability operations willonly fully succeed when U.S. Department of State and other non-lethal decisionmakers are able to authoritatively direct the significant assets that the U.S.Department of Defense brings to the table.
Like most of us, combat armscommanders are slaves to their own background, training and, most importantly,their performance evaluations. Combatarms commanders are rewarded for the conduct of combat operations. Asking themto do anything else is unfair to them. Puttingcombat arms officers in charge of stability operations is the wrong use of anotherwise excellent tool.
The “right set” of militaryleadership should be sourced from other branches of the military. Combatcommanders and casual observers of events in Afghanistan (and other places)will violently object to this proposition, citing the chimera of “security” asthe most important piece of the stability operations puzzle, and they are notwrong. It’s just that combat commandersare the wrong leaders for the operation as a whole.
There is a place for the militarycombat commander, and that place is the conduct of combat operations. And until we put the right type of commanderin charge of stability operations, we will continue to reward ourselves with marginaland unsustainable gains.
-30-
I welcome your comments. tom
The American military is doomed to failure because: (a) it has to compete with high paying careers like on Wall Street that pay wonderfully so you can buy your self-satisfaction and (b) the dull-witted in command can hide as top secret the products of their dullness and bureaucratic in-fighting far better than even the CIA from the President. All Americans care about when it comes to the military is that we don't lose. That makes them feel insecure and humiliated. So long as commanders can hide that from the public, they can always squeeze more money, war toys and troops from the nation. The media will, for the most part, prostitute itself to the Pentagon for access as it lives only on scoops. So in these times of voluntary service when Americans can say: "ain't my kid going to war," so long as they're not seen as losing, generals can always intimidate presidents into more, more more in men and supplies to cover-up their failures with yet another surge. Indeed, Petraeus in a high school level PhD thesis at Princeton argues that COIN success depends on having enough PR guys in your force. Hasting's new book, THE OPERATORS, kind of exposes the "yes sir" losers in the civilian realm where the best and brightest do operate, that command is made up of stunt-men who blame their failure always on the civilians above them. Many of the West Point grads that command were there during the great engineering math cheeting on exams scandal so one just might suspect that abstract calculation is not their forte. Having come up the ranks as "YES SIR" men, one cannot see them as the best of recipients of field criticism from below. What our intel commanders write about the gathering and use of intel by command makes clear why surge-king Petraeus would feel that PR men rather than intel is what he needed. COIN, in the final analysis is stealing the hearts and minds of the people back home with PR rather than winning those of the locals with good CONSTRUCTIVE plans. Thus, our real field focus has been on killing and destroying (even a return to "body count" as PR) rather than on modernizing the society so that it leaves Jihad behind culturally. All that our killer generals produced is ever more people ready to die killing our men in revenge for their relatives that we killed with our mass destruction war toys. Indeed, over the post-war decades we'll discover how during the war a lot of our officers retired in order to come back to the contractor role of COIN and steal $billions. Thus, the concept of COIN was never really testes as our goals were body count of locals killed indiscriminately and $$ stolen, also indiscriminately. The thesis requires, not our best minds to dream up COIN, but to implement it. The high-school drop out or grad seeking college tuition means by joining up, led by the duller knives in the drawer cannot be considered a good test of the COIN warfare thesis. We were warned about this by Marines Gen. Greene in Vietnam but we never learned. Instead, we listened to the "yes sir" wooden heads as we do now who think self-deception the way to eventual victory. History does repeat itself when the best and brightest are silenced by dull command and covered-up by a parallel army of PR men, as recommended by Petraeus based on his "analysis" (sic) of the Vietnam War.
Posted By Thomas E. Ricks
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By Major Tom Mcilwaine, Queen's Royal Hussars
Best Defense guest columnist
Question Set Three -- If we aren't fighting a series of counterinsurgency campaigns, then what are we doing? There are (at least) two possible answers to this question, both of which raise further questions.
The first is that we are fighting a series of punitive campaigns, designed to show to the world the effect of our wrath and the results of crossing us. In which case, why are we concerned with cultural sensitivities and the like -- given that it is presumably their culture (or some part of it) that has led them to displease us in the first place? This may be simplistic (it is) but it is still a question that requires an answer.
The second possible answer is that we are fighting old-fashioned wars of imperial aggression, designed to alter the behavior of other countries so that they better fit into the global system at the head of which sits us; in short, we are compelling our opponent to do our will. This raises a further intriguing question -- if this is the case, why do we look to historical case studies of decolonization for guidance, rather than case studies of colonization? Is it simply so we can feel better about ourselves? There is a third option: We are compelled to invade a country to change its government because it is sheltering terrorist networks that are attacking us. What then?
Or another option, we are compelled to invade a country because of its foreign or nuclear policy that is hostile to our interests but have no interest in reshaping the society and culture in our image at all. What then?
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Posted By Thomas E. Ricks![]()
Friday, February 8, 2013 - 10:24 AM![]()
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Best Defense guest columnist
Question Set Three -- If we aren't fighting a series of counterinsurgency campaigns, then what are we doing? There are (at least) two possible answers to this question, both of which raise further questions.
The first is that we are fighting a series of punitive campaigns, designed to show to the world the effect of our wrath and the results of crossing us. In which case, why are we concerned with cultural sensitivities and the like -- given that it is presumably their culture (or some part of it) that has led them to displease us in the first place? This may be simplistic (it is) but it is still a question that requires an answer.
The second possible answer is that we are fighting old-fashioned wars of imperial aggression, designed to alter the behavior of other countries so that they better fit into the global system at the head of which sits us; in short, we are compelling our opponent to do our will. This raises a further intriguing question -- if this is the case, why do we look to historical case studies of decolonization for guidance, rather than case studies of colonization? Is it simply so we can feel better about ourselves? There is a third option: We are compelled to invade a country to change its government because it is sheltering terrorist networks that are attacking us. What then?
Or another option, we are compelled to invade a country because of its foreign or nuclear policy that is hostile to our interests but have no interest in reshaping the society and culture in our image at all. What then?
Conversation on FP.com
DILNIR
Ah, Kashmir. If it were not for Pakistan, the outside world would consider it about as much as the North-East, by which I mean Nagaland and Mizoram. My best guess is that Indian Army COIN borrows from the usual suspects ; that is, case studies such as Malaya and US experience in South-East Asia. In the times I remember, the Army was called out for, among other things, flag marches through the streets of riot-struck towns and cities. I remember seeing grinning little Gurkhas swanning about Mahim-Matunga-Dadar way with jeeps mounting 106mm RCLs (muzzles shrouded) as well as machine-gun posts at various intersections. Not the sort of thing even the nuttiest Shiv Sainik would have wanted to bugger around with.To be sure that wasn’t COIN just communal rioting The language problem (as well as disproportionate use of force) was illustrated from an anecdote (North-East) where a jawan broke the collar-bone of a local for, what the jawan thought was a bit of lip. Turns out the local was just replying in good faith but was misunderstood; it was a question of local usage. This sort of thing was rarely mentioned at the time (a minimum of 25 years ago).
Kashmir has been a blow hot and cold affair for as long as I remember. Back in those days, there was the double Farooq equation. That is Farooq Abdullah and the Mirwais who had the same name (this last was bumped off at some time) Must have been about the same time that there was a Notable Kidnap, the daughter of a State Government Minister. Demanded something like prisoners release. Now, had it been some ordinary daughter there would have been no negotiation and in the fullness time a headless body would have been discovered. However, the daughter of a Minister being a little different, there was negotiation and release. Next thing you know….(shrugs) Mind you, back then it was the JKLF doing most of the running. The hanging of Maqbool Butt and the related Ravindra Mhatre affair Or Tales of the Duplicity of the British Scum. From Sheikh Abdullah to Farooq Abdullah to the present probably Abdullah to the Next Generation. Etc etc.
Naxals? Been around for years, from when I was still a smallish chap. Only in the beginnings there were decapitations of local politicians, shooting policemen, petty stuff. Nowadays command-detonated bombs seem commonplace and widespread. Bit of a difference between West Bengal where the Naxalites bumpe d off Communists as happily as anybody else ("„When Naxalites have finished CPM, we shall finish Naxalites.*) as the tribal areas. Chhattisgarh was around when when I was still in-country. Not really Jharkand and Orissa though that would be a tribals-associated affair, I shouldn’t wonder. In those old days of t he Cold War there was a Congress warhorse (Keyur Bhushan) who blamed the CIA for Chhattisgarh rumblings. The funny part is that there is a Chattisgarh State now (and apparently Jharkand also) and it is not the CIA in the State Government. The presence of Harry Barnes (with cameo appearance in ‚Who’s Who In The CIA‘) as US Ambassador and his periodic visits to MP doubtless had something to do with it. I myself saw the arrival of a cyclostyled pamphlet with the names of purported ‚CIA‘ agents. Including Ranjit Gupta, who’d by that time been cutting a swathe through WB Naxals like nobody’s business. Good times, I miss them.
Kashmir has been a blow hot and cold affair for as long as I remember. Back in those days, there was the double Farooq equation. That is Farooq Abdullah and the Mirwais who had the same name (this last was bumped off at some time) Must have been about the same time that there was a Notable Kidnap, the daughter of a State Government Minister. Demanded something like prisoners release. Now, had it been some ordinary daughter there would have been no negotiation and in the fullness time a headless body would have been discovered. However, the daughter of a Minister being a little different, there was negotiation and release. Next thing you know….(shrugs) Mind you, back then it was the JKLF doing most of the running. The hanging of Maqbool Butt and the related Ravindra Mhatre affair Or Tales of the Duplicity of the British Scum. From Sheikh Abdullah to Farooq Abdullah to the present probably Abdullah to the Next Generation. Etc etc.
Naxals? Been around for years, from when I was still a smallish chap. Only in the beginnings there were decapitations of local politicians, shooting policemen, petty stuff. Nowadays command-detonated bombs seem commonplace and widespread. Bit of a difference between West Bengal where the Naxalites bumpe d off Communists as happily as anybody else ("„When Naxalites have finished CPM, we shall finish Naxalites.*) as the tribal areas. Chhattisgarh was around when when I was still in-country. Not really Jharkand and Orissa though that would be a tribals-associated affair, I shouldn’t wonder. In those old days of t he Cold War there was a Congress warhorse (Keyur Bhushan) who blamed the CIA for Chhattisgarh rumblings. The funny part is that there is a Chattisgarh State now (and apparently Jharkand also) and it is not the CIA in the State Government. The presence of Harry Barnes (with cameo appearance in ‚Who’s Who In The CIA‘) as US Ambassador and his periodic visits to MP doubtless had something to do with it. I myself saw the arrival of a cyclostyled pamphlet with the names of purported ‚CIA‘ agents. Including Ranjit Gupta, who’d by that time been cutting a swathe through WB Naxals like nobody’s business. Good times, I miss them.
fuzair
My father had Robert Asprey's "The Guerilla in History" in his library and I think I read it somewhere around my senior year in HS (using US equivalent terminology--actually A levels) instead of what I was supposed to be reading. I think it was at that time I came to the conclusion that there are really only two ways to defeat an insurgency: you either flood the country with so many troops that you almost literally drown the insurgents or, if you don't have that many troops to spare, you apply a lot of (intelligently applied and calculated) brutality to make the ‘locals’ fear the government more than they fear the insurgents. In both cases it really helps if you have troops who can speak the language and know the region, although this is not an absolute must.
India in Kashmir has done the former. They have somewhere between 600,000-700-000 security forces in a province whose population is 7.5 million tops--although many of these soldiers are stationed on the border with Pakistan and so are not really COIN troops. Indian COIN philosophy has undergone many changes and, for the Army, has now finally resulted in a policy where they have withdrawn regular battalions from COIN duty and replaced them with specialized COIN battalions, the Rashtriya Rifles. Each RR battalion—and there are 65 of them, more than most armies have regular troops!—is an overstrength infantry battalion (6 companies) with personnel seconded from ‘linked’ regular infantry regiments. This ensures that RR soldiers are trained at the same infantry regiment centre (Bihar, Punjab, Sikh, etc) sent out to the affiliated RR battalion and after a 2-3 year tour are sent back to their ‘home’ regiment; their officers are also from their ‘parent’ regiment. So a Rashtriya Rifle unit will be refered to as 36 RR (Garwhal) or 40 RR (Dogra) to indicate which regiment it is affiliated with and provided its men by, which regimental centre 'looks after' its paperwork, etc. They could have simply created a new formation--such as the Border Security Force, which also takes part in COIN ops--but I guess the Army didn't want to create another competitor.
RR units also have only light weapons and are stationed permanently in COIN areas so there is no ‘institutional loss of memory’ as when an entire unit is posted out. Part of the reason for this is because the Indian Army was afraid of losing its ‘regular war fighting’ capability and training degradation if it continually rotated units in and out of COIN operations. A typical RR battalion will have something like 24 officers, 38 JCOs (warrant officers, sort of) and 1,100 other ranks. All men posted to the RR battalion get an automatic 25% ‘hazard pay’.
There are very few men in the IA who would speak any Kashmiri but most Kashmiris speak Urdu/Hindi so language is not really an issue. RR units posted in the East (Assam etc) I would think would have more of a language issue so the IA is recruiting from there quite heavily, not so much ‘locals’ as Gorkhas settled there (in some cases 3rd or 4th generation) who have no hesitation in serving in the Army.
However, even for the Indian Army 65 battalions (80,000 plus men) is no joke. This meant completely restructuring the Army and changing officers’ career paths, etc., since COIN is now a permanent part of the Army’s mission, just that of a specialized branch of the Army like Armor or Artillery are specialized. There are at least five major generals in the COIN areas (they don’t call them Division commanders but Force Commanders: R-Romeo, D-Delta, V-Victor, K-Kilo, U-Uniform, etc)so specializing in COIN for an officer is not a career-killer as it might have been in the past. The Director General of the RR is a Lt. Gen and the current Indian Army COAS is a former RR Force Commander.
IF you’re going to do COIN, you need to seriously think about how you are going to force your army to take it seriously. I wonder how much people like Maj. Mcilwaine, Petraeus, Nagl, Kilcullen, etc, have studied the Indian Army’s counter-insurgency experience? My guess is not a whole heck of a lot. While the Indians are not really ‘expeditionary COIN’ (despite what some ‘locals’ may think!), it should have given them some thought as to what a military without any legitimacy in the COIN areas has to do to wage COIN there. The more I look at US COIN policy, the more i wonder why anyone thought it had even a remote chance of succeeding.
India in Kashmir has done the former. They have somewhere between 600,000-700-000 security forces in a province whose population is 7.5 million tops--although many of these soldiers are stationed on the border with Pakistan and so are not really COIN troops. Indian COIN philosophy has undergone many changes and, for the Army, has now finally resulted in a policy where they have withdrawn regular battalions from COIN duty and replaced them with specialized COIN battalions, the Rashtriya Rifles. Each RR battalion—and there are 65 of them, more than most armies have regular troops!—is an overstrength infantry battalion (6 companies) with personnel seconded from ‘linked’ regular infantry regiments. This ensures that RR soldiers are trained at the same infantry regiment centre (Bihar, Punjab, Sikh, etc) sent out to the affiliated RR battalion and after a 2-3 year tour are sent back to their ‘home’ regiment; their officers are also from their ‘parent’ regiment. So a Rashtriya Rifle unit will be refered to as 36 RR (Garwhal) or 40 RR (Dogra) to indicate which regiment it is affiliated with and provided its men by, which regimental centre 'looks after' its paperwork, etc. They could have simply created a new formation--such as the Border Security Force, which also takes part in COIN ops--but I guess the Army didn't want to create another competitor.
RR units also have only light weapons and are stationed permanently in COIN areas so there is no ‘institutional loss of memory’ as when an entire unit is posted out. Part of the reason for this is because the Indian Army was afraid of losing its ‘regular war fighting’ capability and training degradation if it continually rotated units in and out of COIN operations. A typical RR battalion will have something like 24 officers, 38 JCOs (warrant officers, sort of) and 1,100 other ranks. All men posted to the RR battalion get an automatic 25% ‘hazard pay’.
There are very few men in the IA who would speak any Kashmiri but most Kashmiris speak Urdu/Hindi so language is not really an issue. RR units posted in the East (Assam etc) I would think would have more of a language issue so the IA is recruiting from there quite heavily, not so much ‘locals’ as Gorkhas settled there (in some cases 3rd or 4th generation) who have no hesitation in serving in the Army.
However, even for the Indian Army 65 battalions (80,000 plus men) is no joke. This meant completely restructuring the Army and changing officers’ career paths, etc., since COIN is now a permanent part of the Army’s mission, just that of a specialized branch of the Army like Armor or Artillery are specialized. There are at least five major generals in the COIN areas (they don’t call them Division commanders but Force Commanders: R-Romeo, D-Delta, V-Victor, K-Kilo, U-Uniform, etc)so specializing in COIN for an officer is not a career-killer as it might have been in the past. The Director General of the RR is a Lt. Gen and the current Indian Army COAS is a former RR Force Commander.
IF you’re going to do COIN, you need to seriously think about how you are going to force your army to take it seriously. I wonder how much people like Maj. Mcilwaine, Petraeus, Nagl, Kilcullen, etc, have studied the Indian Army’s counter-insurgency experience? My guess is not a whole heck of a lot. While the Indians are not really ‘expeditionary COIN’ (despite what some ‘locals’ may think!), it should have given them some thought as to what a military without any legitimacy in the COIN areas has to do to wage COIN there. The more I look at US COIN policy, the more i wonder why anyone thought it had even a remote chance of succeeding.
Tyrtaios
fuzairThe situation in Kashmir may get the bulk of the attention, but calling a spade a shovel, India has a bit of an issue from West Bengal in the northeast to Andhra Pradesh in the south with the Naxalites - what some dub the Red Taliban.
To tell you the truth, I'm not sure India or Pakistan (the latter country for sure) are any better at COIN than the U.S.?
To tell you the truth, I'm not sure India or Pakistan (the latter country for sure) are any better at COIN than the U.S.?
fuzair
Tyrtaios
The PA sees COIN much the same way that the US Army used to (still does?) as a distraction from its real task of preparing to fight the Indians on the Eastern Border.You'll note that I'm not holding the PA up as an exemplar of COIN ;-)
The PA's approach to COIN is a very different matter entirely and probably I'll write an article on it at some point in the very distant future....
The Indians sat down and completely rethought how they were going to handle the insurgent problem and came up with the RR concept. They still have the same problems of a corrupt and shambolic governance structure that helps delegitimize the state but they at least have a more competent military response to the insurgency problem that has kept the lid down.
With the Naxalites outside Assam, from what I know, it is more of a political problem than anything else in the sense that the government is unwilling to let the Army operate in the 'real India'; as opposed to turning it loose in Kashmir and Assam of course.
The Indian government has proposed redeploying some RR battalions to 'static' posts (presumbably to guard key installations), but not to be used in active operations, in the worst hit areas but the Army has essentially refused. The Army wants full-operational control or nothing to do with the mess.
The Indians have about 80+ battalions of various paramilitary troops under the Home Ministry (Central Reserve Police Force, Railway Police, what not and various odds and sods) deployed on CI duty outside Kashmir but these are pretty much useless for anything other than deterrring casual theft and breaking and entering. If you've ever seen the typical Indian policeman, you'd understand why they are less than useless. Every now and then the Naxalites carry out a particularly nasty ambush or police thana raid and butcher a platoon or company of these poor bastards.Unsurprisingly, these troops tend to run at the first shot fired.
The Home Ministry had proposed stationing some 30+ battalions of these in Kashmir and sending the relieved RR units out to the worst affected areas. The Army's counter-proposal was to raise the strength of the RR to 100 battalions (sanctioned strenght; vs. 65 actually raised) and then use these in the Naxalite areas.The local politicans have refused to turn over large parts of their states to the Army since even the 'kinder gentler COIN' of the Indian Army has a very real iron fist that tends to smash both the guilty and the innocent pretty hard. And calling in teh Army is a complete admission of failure.
The compromise has been that the Army has started training the Central Paramilitary Forces in the worst hit areas of Jharkhand, Chattisgarh and Orissa. But like most such compromises, it really isn't working particularly well.
The PA sees COIN much the same way that the US Army used to (still does?) as a distraction from its real task of preparing to fight the Indians on the Eastern Border.You'll note that I'm not holding the PA up as an exemplar of COIN ;-)
The PA's approach to COIN is a very different matter entirely and probably I'll write an article on it at some point in the very distant future....
The Indians sat down and completely rethought how they were going to handle the insurgent problem and came up with the RR concept. They still have the same problems of a corrupt and shambolic governance structure that helps delegitimize the state but they at least have a more competent military response to the insurgency problem that has kept the lid down.
With the Naxalites outside Assam, from what I know, it is more of a political problem than anything else in the sense that the government is unwilling to let the Army operate in the 'real India'; as opposed to turning it loose in Kashmir and Assam of course.
The Indian government has proposed redeploying some RR battalions to 'static' posts (presumbably to guard key installations), but not to be used in active operations, in the worst hit areas but the Army has essentially refused. The Army wants full-operational control or nothing to do with the mess.
The Indians have about 80+ battalions of various paramilitary troops under the Home Ministry (Central Reserve Police Force, Railway Police, what not and various odds and sods) deployed on CI duty outside Kashmir but these are pretty much useless for anything other than deterrring casual theft and breaking and entering. If you've ever seen the typical Indian policeman, you'd understand why they are less than useless. Every now and then the Naxalites carry out a particularly nasty ambush or police thana raid and butcher a platoon or company of these poor bastards.Unsurprisingly, these troops tend to run at the first shot fired.
The Home Ministry had proposed stationing some 30+ battalions of these in Kashmir and sending the relieved RR units out to the worst affected areas. The Army's counter-proposal was to raise the strength of the RR to 100 battalions (sanctioned strenght; vs. 65 actually raised) and then use these in the Naxalite areas.The local politicans have refused to turn over large parts of their states to the Army since even the 'kinder gentler COIN' of the Indian Army has a very real iron fist that tends to smash both the guilty and the innocent pretty hard. And calling in teh Army is a complete admission of failure.
The compromise has been that the Army has started training the Central Paramilitary Forces in the worst hit areas of Jharkhand, Chattisgarh and Orissa. But like most such compromises, it really isn't working particularly well.
Tyrtaios
fuzairAn interesting perspective . . . . Thank you!
williejoe
If we are looking for successful models why not study how we came out of the Revolutionary War ( or the colonial unpleasantness) with our necks of normal length and a constitution. Why and how did Mao beat the Nationalists? The V C P defeat the French colonial regime? If you want to know the conditions of success against an insurgency find the critical and common elements of the ones that succeeded and devise ways to undermine those conditions or accept that sometimes the bear and the beer get you.
Tyrtaios
williejoe There is something to learn from many examples and sources, but most of all is to recognize that conditions vary from one example to another and one template will never fit all.
Mao Tse Tung decided that success might take decades to achieve and one should be ready for set-backs, which should point to strategic patience being needed by anyone deciding to intervene, whether in the cold or hot phase of a challenge to the stability of a foreign government and recognize whether the resources expended are worth it.
Additionally, when reading "On Guerrilla Warfare," which in essence is a training manual, the would be counter-insurgent needs to recognize Mao's further writings which point to a successful insurgency as having multiple lines of effort toward revolutionary war, of which only one is violence, and always include a strategically political end.
Also keep in mind that the Mao had phases for revolutionary warfare, and we saw the recent modern insurgents streaming out of Libya jumping right into a hot phase in Mali. Therefore, as Clausewitz stated, war evolves and insurgency is only one aspect of war.
So, it is possible revolutionary war has evolved beyond what Mao recognized, or General George Washington as well. Which is why it is important to ask the questions the good Major of Queen's Royal Hussars is asking so that as counter-insurgents we also evolve?
Mao Tse Tung decided that success might take decades to achieve and one should be ready for set-backs, which should point to strategic patience being needed by anyone deciding to intervene, whether in the cold or hot phase of a challenge to the stability of a foreign government and recognize whether the resources expended are worth it.
Additionally, when reading "On Guerrilla Warfare," which in essence is a training manual, the would be counter-insurgent needs to recognize Mao's further writings which point to a successful insurgency as having multiple lines of effort toward revolutionary war, of which only one is violence, and always include a strategically political end.
Also keep in mind that the Mao had phases for revolutionary warfare, and we saw the recent modern insurgents streaming out of Libya jumping right into a hot phase in Mali. Therefore, as Clausewitz stated, war evolves and insurgency is only one aspect of war.
So, it is possible revolutionary war has evolved beyond what Mao recognized, or General George Washington as well. Which is why it is important to ask the questions the good Major of Queen's Royal Hussars is asking so that as counter-insurgents we also evolve?
williejoe
Tyrtaios williejoe An excellent point well made as usual. I was trying to get at the human element in the equation. To revolt against a state is to risk it all,persons of both the right and left who have tried to carry out armed struggle or rebellion in the U.S. have swiftly fallen to the police agencies of the state. God help the poor fools who tangle with a Marine company or a Stryker unit. Yet some have tried it or proposed it, why? I'm looking at post 1865 America of course only a madman would want to wish that horror on the nation again. The same question arises in the world right now,in Syria,North Africa,Somalia,Afganistan why are people willing to pay the horrendous price of the Syrian rebellion and how are they succeeding against a modern,trained and heavily armed force that is holding nothing back. The Pashtun have been fighting in Afghanistan for how long now against all comers- why? What don't we understand about the human element that has led to frustration and very limited success.
backischance
Tyrtaios williejoe All points well made. COIN manuals won't do it. The world is way too complex for doctrines. History tells us no doctrine will stand, trumping reality and the complexities of the human spirit. Flexibility, top notch intel, and training for the unexpected have a chance from time to time.
There's a world of difference between insurgency and terrorism. We've gotten them confused, IMHO.
There's a world of difference between insurgency and terrorism. We've gotten them confused, IMHO.
williejoe
Tyrtaios On the topic of evolution the article entitled Start-Up Sovereigns in today's F P is very interesting, it reminds me of the book Stand on Zanzibar by John Brunner(1968).
DILNIR
Afghanistan. There may well have been a punitive element here. Notably the bombing of dams and other infrastructure without any obvious military rationale. Though the Kajaki Dam did, for a short while, permit UK forces to trumpet their grand success in transporting a turbine on a long journey and claiming a hefty body-count into the bargain. Though for some reason, power generation from this site appears near non-existent. The arrival of the turbine was, presumably, done in a COIN context. Then again, perhaps not. God alone knows what these damn gora log are about.
In the days of yore, the punitive expedition didn’t take cultural considerations into account, or any consideration of any sort, truth be told. Then again, the idea was, well, punitive, and not intended to support a local puppet government. Whenever punitive didn’t provide a lasting solution, which was probably most of the time, the Punisher often opted for occupation combined with a local despot who could be clobbered if he didn’t come across with the tribute on time.
The notion of altering the ‘behaviour’ of a nation must surely be considered as a comical notion. A nation isn’t an individual, after all. But it does make for a succint sound-bite, usually accompanied by an imbecilic grin and an off-handed delivery. Historical case studies of decolonisation ; not at all a bad idea. Top of the list for the contemporary world would undoubtedly be the British departure from Aden circa 1967. Another way, not connected with colonialism, would be the saga of Anwar Sadat and his supporting role behind Abdullah Sallal and the Nasserist experiment in Yemen (the non-Communist one, that is).
Nice to know that the author contemplates invading Iran. Where is he studying ?
In the days of yore, the punitive expedition didn’t take cultural considerations into account, or any consideration of any sort, truth be told. Then again, the idea was, well, punitive, and not intended to support a local puppet government. Whenever punitive didn’t provide a lasting solution, which was probably most of the time, the Punisher often opted for occupation combined with a local despot who could be clobbered if he didn’t come across with the tribute on time.
The notion of altering the ‘behaviour’ of a nation must surely be considered as a comical notion. A nation isn’t an individual, after all. But it does make for a succint sound-bite, usually accompanied by an imbecilic grin and an off-handed delivery. Historical case studies of decolonisation ; not at all a bad idea. Top of the list for the contemporary world would undoubtedly be the British departure from Aden circa 1967. Another way, not connected with colonialism, would be the saga of Anwar Sadat and his supporting role behind Abdullah Sallal and the Nasserist experiment in Yemen (the non-Communist one, that is).
Nice to know that the author contemplates invading Iran. Where is he studying ?
HUNTERS
This poster makes the classic Western mistake of trying to bifurcate a problem. That is to say, this is either this or that. The fact is these conflicts aren't easy to categorize because they are a little bit of everything. At USAWC we had to write a paper deining whether Vietnam was a conventional war, a hybrid, a counter insurgency, a civil war, etc. The correct answer, if there is one, is all of the above...but at different moments in time. You also have the issue of personalities snd their separate motivations. Bush Jr. Might have only wanted revenge for a planned attack on his daddy, while Cheney might have sought co trol of oil...and Rumsfeld wanted to demonstrate the nee technocentric military. All may be true, or none...or varying degrees. If it was easy anyone could do it.
Kriegsakademie
@HUNTERS............... Hunters, I think this is not a fair rap on Maj Tom’s intent. To successfully design a war that you can win, you must have clarity about the nature of the objectives, the nature of the opponents, and the degree of commitment you bring to the effort. In Vietnam we did not start with the clarity, so the war morphed as the circumstances and the personalities changed. That is not the way things should be. I give the major points for asking useful questions. This is not “bifurcatuing”, it is “clarifying”. Yes, it is possible that in some situation the answer might be a compound of more than one of his options, but you get to that compound objective by clear and focused analysis of your war aims and their context. K
Kriegsakademie
Iraq and Afghanistan were waged more or less along the lines of Answer #2: we sought to compel our opponent to do our will The sub-question to #2 is a good one: If we are doing what classical wars used to do, why do we look at colonial wars for our models? One answer may be that as a super-power our lens on war says “Big war = classical war” and “Small war = some variant of colonial war” Perhaps if we had started with a clearer lens in conceptualizing our aims in Irag and especially in Afghanistan we would have recognized that we were setting out on a path of classical war……………….K
JPWREL
Kriegsakademie
As usual an excellent and thoughtful response by Kriegsakademie. However, Major Mcilwaine uses the term ‘we’ as if the thinking in Whitehall and Washington was joined at the hip. Perhaps I am a hopeless cynic but I suspect it wasn’t with the exception of Blair whose ego drove him to pretend he was a global player. The London felt compelled to follow Churchill’s formula to never allow space to open up between themselves and the US.
The British showed more sense and backbone during Vietnam when they intuitively realized that we didn’t know what the hell we were doing and declined the honor to participate. Perhaps in the meantime they thought we had matured and learned something since that fiasco and would be more responsible and calculating. Looks like the joke was on them.
As usual an excellent and thoughtful response by Kriegsakademie. However, Major Mcilwaine uses the term ‘we’ as if the thinking in Whitehall and Washington was joined at the hip. Perhaps I am a hopeless cynic but I suspect it wasn’t with the exception of Blair whose ego drove him to pretend he was a global player. The London felt compelled to follow Churchill’s formula to never allow space to open up between themselves and the US.
The British showed more sense and backbone during Vietnam when they intuitively realized that we didn’t know what the hell we were doing and declined the honor to participate. Perhaps in the meantime they thought we had matured and learned something since that fiasco and would be more responsible and calculating. Looks like the joke was on them.
Gold Star Father
JPWREL Were the British not mired down in Eire and Rhodesia during this time period and absolutely ill-prepared to extend to satisfy Washington? Did they do some backdoor phoning to Canberra to move in their stead, SEATO and all that, what?
DILNIR
Gold Star Father JPWREL
Eire? Rhodesia? More likely, the Retreat from Empire would have made participation prohibitively expensive. They did of course participate in Korea; yes, that was supposedly a UN operation. As for Australia, must have depended on the PM. As they said:
Menzies: British to the boot-straps.
Holt: All the way with LBJ.
Gorton: Australia first.
No idea of how NZ went, given that some of their SAS did participate in Vietnam (unless I'm mistaken)
Eire? Rhodesia? More likely, the Retreat from Empire would have made participation prohibitively expensive. They did of course participate in Korea; yes, that was supposedly a UN operation. As for Australia, must have depended on the PM. As they said:
Menzies: British to the boot-straps.
Holt: All the way with LBJ.
Gorton: Australia first.
No idea of how NZ went, given that some of their SAS did participate in Vietnam (unless I'm mistaken)
AndyWisniewski1
Gold Star Father JPWREL The British weren't militarily committed at all in Rhodesia, Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence and Briton threw sanctions on them and said choke on your "freedom".
JPWREL
Gold Star Father
Major British troop presence in Northern Ireland was more a 70's thing after ‘Bloody Sunday’ and I don't recall any significant British troop presence in Rhodesia. A MOD document that was opened to the public indicates that they felt the war was unwinnable as early as 1965 and wanted the Americans to quickly find a way to extract themselves.
Major British troop presence in Northern Ireland was more a 70's thing after ‘Bloody Sunday’ and I don't recall any significant British troop presence in Rhodesia. A MOD document that was opened to the public indicates that they felt the war was unwinnable as early as 1965 and wanted the Americans to quickly find a way to extract themselves.
Gold Star Father
JPWREL
Ireland, no? Rhodesia, no? ah...Canada? No? ah...Belize? No?
Maybe the British just listened to The Greatest: "I ain't no quarrel with them Viet Cong".
Ireland, no? Rhodesia, no? ah...Canada? No? ah...Belize? No?
Maybe the British just listened to The Greatest: "I ain't no quarrel with them Viet Cong".
JPWREL
Gold Star Father Cassius Clay's (aka The Louisville Lip) advice was a lot better than all the 'best and brightest' in Washington were able to manage.
Kriegsakademie
@DILNIR NZ in VN...............the Kiwis were in for a good chunk of the NV war period. They sent infantry and SAS. Much of the time they co-located with the Aussies at Bearcat - since the Aussies had considerable support infrastructure. Plenty of Kiwis fought (and died) in our war. ................ Not surprisingly, the effort was not popular at home. Kiwi civilians tend toward an Islander's view of war - - - "if we're not threatened, best to stay out".
Michael_Vredenburg
Gold Star Father JPWREL Aden and Oman.
fuzair
DILNIR Gold Star Father JPWREL
I thought the Australians were concerned that the British Empire would no longer be able to provide them with 'protection' and so were looking for another source. Ergo their decision to send about 7,500 troops IIRC. The Australians were part of SEATO and took their obligations seriously.
However, their troop contribution, I would think, was too small to make much of an impact on the overall situation, their experience in Malaya and the Confrontation notwithstanding. Very few--obvious exceptions on this board!--remember that the S. Koreans contributed two divisions and a reinforced Marine brigade to Vietnam--although Park Chung Hee really squeezed the US for it monetarily. OK troop strength did reach just about 50,000 IIRC. I've read they were extremely effective, albeit extremely brutal, in suppressing the VC. Massacares and brutality seemed to be the hallmark of their operations. Apparently the North Koreans also sent troops--AA units and a fighter squadron--but obviously to fight on the other side!
Incidentally, LBJ also asked Pakistan for troops (IIRC two infantry divisions) but Ayub Khan's response was on the lines of "If Kennedy had consulted us, as he had promised to do, before arming India, we'd be inclined to favorably consider the request. As it is, we can't spare the troops since we now face a much stronger India." Probably a self-serving reply but it keep Pakistan out of Vietnam.
I thought the Australians were concerned that the British Empire would no longer be able to provide them with 'protection' and so were looking for another source. Ergo their decision to send about 7,500 troops IIRC. The Australians were part of SEATO and took their obligations seriously.
However, their troop contribution, I would think, was too small to make much of an impact on the overall situation, their experience in Malaya and the Confrontation notwithstanding. Very few--obvious exceptions on this board!--remember that the S. Koreans contributed two divisions and a reinforced Marine brigade to Vietnam--although Park Chung Hee really squeezed the US for it monetarily. OK troop strength did reach just about 50,000 IIRC. I've read they were extremely effective, albeit extremely brutal, in suppressing the VC. Massacares and brutality seemed to be the hallmark of their operations. Apparently the North Koreans also sent troops--AA units and a fighter squadron--but obviously to fight on the other side!
Incidentally, LBJ also asked Pakistan for troops (IIRC two infantry divisions) but Ayub Khan's response was on the lines of "If Kennedy had consulted us, as he had promised to do, before arming India, we'd be inclined to favorably consider the request. As it is, we can't spare the troops since we now face a much stronger India." Probably a self-serving reply but it keep Pakistan out of Vietnam.
JPWREL
fuzair DILNIR Gold Star Father Diggers always seem to be worth more than their absolute numbers.
Tyrtaios
JPWREL KriegsakademieOddly, although the British opted out of Viet-Nam, another part of the Common Wealth participated, and did an admirable job in a bankrupt cause, the Australians who brought lessons learned in Malaysia earlier.
However, why look at colonial models? If for no other reason not to look at them, the methods used as a whole are no longer available to us, nor, if one really looks at those methods closely should a democratic nation use them.
If we are to look backward for lessons learned to go forward with we should find where we and others were successful and study the varying conditions present that allowed a particular approach to be taken. But in doing so not cherry pick such in El Salvador where one might be quick to point out our success, but also fail to admit the death squads kept status quo until the political climate changed due to outside dynamics and both sides negotiated . . . Although, an often forgotten successful model after our 1950s success in the Philippines to look at might be our advisory role by 1st Special Forces in Thailand.
Remember, it is the Tet Lunar New Year and one should not eat shrimp during the celebration as shrimp move backward in their natural environment and we don't want to go into the year of the snake with a propensity to move backward, but rather forward.
Chuc mung nam moi!
However, why look at colonial models? If for no other reason not to look at them, the methods used as a whole are no longer available to us, nor, if one really looks at those methods closely should a democratic nation use them.
If we are to look backward for lessons learned to go forward with we should find where we and others were successful and study the varying conditions present that allowed a particular approach to be taken. But in doing so not cherry pick such in El Salvador where one might be quick to point out our success, but also fail to admit the death squads kept status quo until the political climate changed due to outside dynamics and both sides negotiated . . . Although, an often forgotten successful model after our 1950s success in the Philippines to look at might be our advisory role by 1st Special Forces in Thailand.
Remember, it is the Tet Lunar New Year and one should not eat shrimp during the celebration as shrimp move backward in their natural environment and we don't want to go into the year of the snake with a propensity to move backward, but rather forward.
Chuc mung nam moi!
Gold Star Father
Tyrtaios
Bia cua ban co the la tuyet voi trong nam nay Marine
Bia cua ban co the la tuyet voi trong nam nay Marine
JPWREL
Gold Star Father Tyrtaios
Since GSF has brought up the extremely import subject of beer, let it be know that I have finally mastered the art of a 'Black & Tan'.
By Gianni Koskinas
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Maintaining a large military presence in Afghanistan is not in the strategic interests of either the U.S. or the Afghan government. It does not help the United States accomplish its long-term goal of countering terrorism from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, nor its short-term goal of helping Afghanistan achieve stability and self-reliance in fighting insurgency. It is also economically unsustainable. However, retaining a smaller, lighter, residual presence in Afghanistan is critical to U.S. strategy and vital to core U.S. interests.
Additionally, U.S. strategy in Afghanistan must be based on a vision that goes out decades: Considering only short-term goals amounts to strategic myopia, unworthy of the sacrifices made by almost 2,200 U.S. service members in Afghanistan alone.
A Case for Lighter, Smarter, Long-term Residual Presence
With Osama Bin Laden dead and al-Qaeda's capabilities diminished in the Af-Pak region, the immediate threat of attacks on the U.S. from the region has greatly diminished. But the ingredients that could help Al Qaeda regenerate in the next decade remain, and thus the mission endures.
In fact, the "surge" of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2009 had little to do with bin Laden; rather, it was an attempt to rescue the failing mission of stabilizing Afghanistan. Bin Laden was hunted and killed not by the surge, but by a small, specialized group, the likes of which I argue should remain in Afghanistan to monitor and guard against the long-term threat of terrorist cells.
More importantly, a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy must include the training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to counter domestic threats. But this will take significantly longer than estimates suggest. As such, the U.S. must alter its stated strategy in Afghanistan to consider the training and equipping of the ANSF a key element of its plan to counter threats, and support Afghanistan in its domestic fight against terrorists that, left unchecked, could re-emerge. The numbers of trainers must be kept low and should not be outsourced to contractors. Currently, the only elements specifically designed to counter insurgencies are the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). Considering the nuanced task, the training force should be predominantly SOF.
With nearly 2,200 troops dead, thousands more wounded, and half a trillion dollars spent in America's longest war, merely staying the course in Afghanistan is no longer possible. In fact, with no sound opposition to President Obama's plan of swift withdrawal, the U.S. has decided to accelerate the transition from combat to training mission and, arguably less advertised, concentrate forces in a few heavily fortified locations such as Bagram Air Base.
Eleven one-year strategies in Afghanistan have brought us to a point where people consider "strategic retreat" the best of the worst options available. In pursuing this plan, however, the United States and its strategic partners in the Afghan Government risk a return to a time where fractured Afghan groups battled for supremacy, and an apathetic and financially exhausted U.S. didn't want to spend any more blood or treasure. History has shown that this "strategic retreat," fails to consider the greater geo-strategic importance of maintaining a U.S. presence in Afghanistan
Without a firm presence in Afghanistan, the U.S. will have no bases in South-Central Asia. The only other alternative is Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan, whose lease is going to expire in 2014, and Kyrgyz President Almaz Atambayev has made it clear that his government will not extend the agreement any further. From a regional perspective alone, the U.S. must maintain a residual footprint in Afghanistan as a mechanism of influencing Central and South Asia. Stability in the AfPak region is critical in monitoring and combating a reemergence of al-Qaeda.
Ultimately, for the Obama Administration to achieve its objective of maintaining pressure on al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the region, and supporting Afghanistan as a strategic partner - it must consider a nuanced strategy when looking at the composition of the U.S. residual presence. After 2014, Obama should employ a specialized force with a light footprint, but a big contribution. I recommend the following elements be in the mix:
1. A counter-terrorism task force to focus on the remnants of al-Qaeda and any insurgent groups that pose a threat to U.S. assets and interests. The specialized CT elements need to be able to engage targets throughout the country, so this will have to include both primary bases, and lily pads to extend their reach. These elements should train and utilize their Afghan counterparts as much as possible; ultimately, the Afghan counter-terrorism elements themselves should take over.
2. A robust counter-insurgency training force comprised of both ground and air special operations forces that will focus on the training of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in specialized COIN training - similar to that in Colombia. This extends to the mentoring of the Afghan Air Force, civil affairs, etc.
3. The only "conventional force" presence should be in the protection of U.S./Coalition bases. These bases should have maximum flexibility by maintaining minimal infrastructure in only 4 locations (Bagram in the East, Mazar-e-Sharif in the North, Herat in the West, and Bastion in the South). Additionally, a limited aviation training presence should be kept in the main training base for the Afghan Air Force, Shindand Airfield. The U.S. will probably maintain Bagram and Kabul, whereas Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, and Bastion should be supported by NATO partners.
4. In Kabul, all that should remain are the headquarters at ISAF - with some of its coalition partners' participation - a limited contingent on the military side of the Kabul airfield, and a NATO Training Mission Afghanistan command.
5. SOF should abandon the "Afghan Local Police" (ALP) in most areas and focus more on the development of the ANSF. A few years ago, with over 100,000 U.S. personnel in country, SOF could afford to focus on the ALP concept. Now, with only a few thousand U.S. service members in-country, the emphasis must be on the uniformed security services.
In terms of numbers, the right mix is about 4,000 SOF and SOF enablers, and 4-5,000 conventional forces and headquarters support. While the 9,000 U.S. personnel seems to be the "just enough" figure for an enduring presence, it seems the President may now be set on a lower figure due to financial constraints.
Setting a Long-Term U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan
The United States non-military strategic course in Central and South Asia needs to start in 2015, not end in 2014. The U.S. needs to consider its 2025 strategic vision, and make smaller contributions to the region but with bigger payoffs.
For example, the U.S. should work with other key allies to coordinate on increasing trade and creating more jobs in a region that is currently plagued with high rates of unemployment and poverty. Coordinating with Pakistan and investment giants such as the United Arab Emirates to secure funding for a road or railroad from Helmand to the port of Gwadar, or with Qatar to invest in Afghanistan's and Pakistan's natural resources can create thousands of jobs and boost economies. This is not something that is purely altruistic; such activities can greatly benefit U.S. interests. Furthermore, a strategic "pivot to Asia" can only be accomplished if there is stability in Central and South Asia. Afghanistan is critical to trade corridors from oil-gas rich Central Asia states (including Afghanistan) to the end users of South and East Asia. In effect, Afghanistan's geo-strategic importance goes far beyond trans-national terrorism threats.
Over the past 11 years, the international community has committed billions of dollars in an effort to stabilize and reconstruct a country ravaged by three decades of war. The U.S. alone has spent over $600 billion in the longest war in its history, with over $20 billion in governance and development funds. And yet, Afghanistan is still not economically self-sustainable. Perhaps that is not so shocking, though. President Obama himself made it clear (as early as May 2012) that, "Our goal is not to build a country in America's image, or to eradicate every vestige of the Taliban. These objectives would require many more years, many more dollars and many more American lives."
Another way of looking at this, however, is the way most American veterans of the conflict view their sacrifices: as a strategic investment. They might argue that the dollars spent and the lives lost deserve a much more impressive outcome than simply a strategic retreat with Afghanistan in dire straits.
For their part, few Afghans welcome the U.S. withdrawal. While important to equip and strengthen the Afghan security forces, Presidents Karzai and Obama did not address crafting a long-term strategy that looks towards a stable Afghanistan in 2030, rather than a short-term "stable enough to transition security" by 2014.
Presidents Karzai and Obama - two leaders unable to seek reelection and concerned about their legacy - may still be able to give the people of Afghanistan a gift that can help stabilize Afghanistan. President Karzai has a unique opportunity to leverage his last year in government to broker a deal that can offer real hope of change and progress. On the American side, the U.S. and other donors should minimize "hand out" aid and focus on investments in Afghanistan. Donor programs don't create revenue, but rather act as symptomatic relief. Public funds, partnered with private firms, can help develop a self-sustaining Afghan economy. For the past three decades, the United States has appeared to prefer short-term strategies. They did not recognize the long-term consequences of inattention following the Soviet withdrawal. They seemed satisfied with the near term and non-committal cruise missile-targeting of Osama Bin Laden after a series of terrorist attacks in the late 1990s.
President Obama's inaugural speech last month made it clear that the "decade of war" has come to a close. By 2014, the U.S. should conclude this chapter by leaving behind a small training force, a robust counter-terrorism force, and an economic support model that is viable in the long-term. Significant intellectual and limited monetary capital must go toward achieving sustainable Afghan economic growth in the mid-to-long-term. Rather than how much is spent in Afghanistan, donors - and in particular, the U.S. as the largest - need to start paying attention more to effectiveness of what is spent.
Ultimately, the most important date on our 2014 calendar should be the April Afghan Presidential election rather than the December withdrawal deadline. If the election is not credible or moderately successful in maintaining the trust of key stakeholders in the democratic progress, the numbers of U.S. troops remaining will not make much difference in the post-election environment. The Afghan people and the international community will be watching closely to ensure that the election is an example of the democratic progress that 13 years of Coalition presence made possible. The troop levels, important as they may be, are only secondary to the success of the political process.
Gianni Koskinas was a military officer for over twenty years and now focuses on economic development projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
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Since GSF has brought up the extremely import subject of beer, let it be know that I have finally mastered the art of a 'Black & Tan'.
What Afghanistan needs after 2014: A lighter, smarter, long-term commitment
By Gianni Koskinas ![]()
Tuesday, February 12, 2013 - 12:16 PM![]()
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Maintaining a large military presence in Afghanistan is not in the strategic interests of either the U.S. or the Afghan government. It does not help the United States accomplish its long-term goal of countering terrorism from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, nor its short-term goal of helping Afghanistan achieve stability and self-reliance in fighting insurgency. It is also economically unsustainable. However, retaining a smaller, lighter, residual presence in Afghanistan is critical to U.S. strategy and vital to core U.S. interests.
Additionally, U.S. strategy in Afghanistan must be based on a vision that goes out decades: Considering only short-term goals amounts to strategic myopia, unworthy of the sacrifices made by almost 2,200 U.S. service members in Afghanistan alone.
A Case for Lighter, Smarter, Long-term Residual Presence
With Osama Bin Laden dead and al-Qaeda's capabilities diminished in the Af-Pak region, the immediate threat of attacks on the U.S. from the region has greatly diminished. But the ingredients that could help Al Qaeda regenerate in the next decade remain, and thus the mission endures.
In fact, the "surge" of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2009 had little to do with bin Laden; rather, it was an attempt to rescue the failing mission of stabilizing Afghanistan. Bin Laden was hunted and killed not by the surge, but by a small, specialized group, the likes of which I argue should remain in Afghanistan to monitor and guard against the long-term threat of terrorist cells.
More importantly, a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy must include the training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to counter domestic threats. But this will take significantly longer than estimates suggest. As such, the U.S. must alter its stated strategy in Afghanistan to consider the training and equipping of the ANSF a key element of its plan to counter threats, and support Afghanistan in its domestic fight against terrorists that, left unchecked, could re-emerge. The numbers of trainers must be kept low and should not be outsourced to contractors. Currently, the only elements specifically designed to counter insurgencies are the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). Considering the nuanced task, the training force should be predominantly SOF.
With nearly 2,200 troops dead, thousands more wounded, and half a trillion dollars spent in America's longest war, merely staying the course in Afghanistan is no longer possible. In fact, with no sound opposition to President Obama's plan of swift withdrawal, the U.S. has decided to accelerate the transition from combat to training mission and, arguably less advertised, concentrate forces in a few heavily fortified locations such as Bagram Air Base.
Eleven one-year strategies in Afghanistan have brought us to a point where people consider "strategic retreat" the best of the worst options available. In pursuing this plan, however, the United States and its strategic partners in the Afghan Government risk a return to a time where fractured Afghan groups battled for supremacy, and an apathetic and financially exhausted U.S. didn't want to spend any more blood or treasure. History has shown that this "strategic retreat," fails to consider the greater geo-strategic importance of maintaining a U.S. presence in Afghanistan
Without a firm presence in Afghanistan, the U.S. will have no bases in South-Central Asia. The only other alternative is Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan, whose lease is going to expire in 2014, and Kyrgyz President Almaz Atambayev has made it clear that his government will not extend the agreement any further. From a regional perspective alone, the U.S. must maintain a residual footprint in Afghanistan as a mechanism of influencing Central and South Asia. Stability in the AfPak region is critical in monitoring and combating a reemergence of al-Qaeda.
Ultimately, for the Obama Administration to achieve its objective of maintaining pressure on al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the region, and supporting Afghanistan as a strategic partner - it must consider a nuanced strategy when looking at the composition of the U.S. residual presence. After 2014, Obama should employ a specialized force with a light footprint, but a big contribution. I recommend the following elements be in the mix:
1. A counter-terrorism task force to focus on the remnants of al-Qaeda and any insurgent groups that pose a threat to U.S. assets and interests. The specialized CT elements need to be able to engage targets throughout the country, so this will have to include both primary bases, and lily pads to extend their reach. These elements should train and utilize their Afghan counterparts as much as possible; ultimately, the Afghan counter-terrorism elements themselves should take over.
2. A robust counter-insurgency training force comprised of both ground and air special operations forces that will focus on the training of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in specialized COIN training - similar to that in Colombia. This extends to the mentoring of the Afghan Air Force, civil affairs, etc.
3. The only "conventional force" presence should be in the protection of U.S./Coalition bases. These bases should have maximum flexibility by maintaining minimal infrastructure in only 4 locations (Bagram in the East, Mazar-e-Sharif in the North, Herat in the West, and Bastion in the South). Additionally, a limited aviation training presence should be kept in the main training base for the Afghan Air Force, Shindand Airfield. The U.S. will probably maintain Bagram and Kabul, whereas Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, and Bastion should be supported by NATO partners.
4. In Kabul, all that should remain are the headquarters at ISAF - with some of its coalition partners' participation - a limited contingent on the military side of the Kabul airfield, and a NATO Training Mission Afghanistan command.
5. SOF should abandon the "Afghan Local Police" (ALP) in most areas and focus more on the development of the ANSF. A few years ago, with over 100,000 U.S. personnel in country, SOF could afford to focus on the ALP concept. Now, with only a few thousand U.S. service members in-country, the emphasis must be on the uniformed security services.
In terms of numbers, the right mix is about 4,000 SOF and SOF enablers, and 4-5,000 conventional forces and headquarters support. While the 9,000 U.S. personnel seems to be the "just enough" figure for an enduring presence, it seems the President may now be set on a lower figure due to financial constraints.
Setting a Long-Term U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan
The United States non-military strategic course in Central and South Asia needs to start in 2015, not end in 2014. The U.S. needs to consider its 2025 strategic vision, and make smaller contributions to the region but with bigger payoffs.
For example, the U.S. should work with other key allies to coordinate on increasing trade and creating more jobs in a region that is currently plagued with high rates of unemployment and poverty. Coordinating with Pakistan and investment giants such as the United Arab Emirates to secure funding for a road or railroad from Helmand to the port of Gwadar, or with Qatar to invest in Afghanistan's and Pakistan's natural resources can create thousands of jobs and boost economies. This is not something that is purely altruistic; such activities can greatly benefit U.S. interests. Furthermore, a strategic "pivot to Asia" can only be accomplished if there is stability in Central and South Asia. Afghanistan is critical to trade corridors from oil-gas rich Central Asia states (including Afghanistan) to the end users of South and East Asia. In effect, Afghanistan's geo-strategic importance goes far beyond trans-national terrorism threats.
Over the past 11 years, the international community has committed billions of dollars in an effort to stabilize and reconstruct a country ravaged by three decades of war. The U.S. alone has spent over $600 billion in the longest war in its history, with over $20 billion in governance and development funds. And yet, Afghanistan is still not economically self-sustainable. Perhaps that is not so shocking, though. President Obama himself made it clear (as early as May 2012) that, "Our goal is not to build a country in America's image, or to eradicate every vestige of the Taliban. These objectives would require many more years, many more dollars and many more American lives."
Another way of looking at this, however, is the way most American veterans of the conflict view their sacrifices: as a strategic investment. They might argue that the dollars spent and the lives lost deserve a much more impressive outcome than simply a strategic retreat with Afghanistan in dire straits.
For their part, few Afghans welcome the U.S. withdrawal. While important to equip and strengthen the Afghan security forces, Presidents Karzai and Obama did not address crafting a long-term strategy that looks towards a stable Afghanistan in 2030, rather than a short-term "stable enough to transition security" by 2014.
Presidents Karzai and Obama - two leaders unable to seek reelection and concerned about their legacy - may still be able to give the people of Afghanistan a gift that can help stabilize Afghanistan. President Karzai has a unique opportunity to leverage his last year in government to broker a deal that can offer real hope of change and progress. On the American side, the U.S. and other donors should minimize "hand out" aid and focus on investments in Afghanistan. Donor programs don't create revenue, but rather act as symptomatic relief. Public funds, partnered with private firms, can help develop a self-sustaining Afghan economy. For the past three decades, the United States has appeared to prefer short-term strategies. They did not recognize the long-term consequences of inattention following the Soviet withdrawal. They seemed satisfied with the near term and non-committal cruise missile-targeting of Osama Bin Laden after a series of terrorist attacks in the late 1990s.
President Obama's inaugural speech last month made it clear that the "decade of war" has come to a close. By 2014, the U.S. should conclude this chapter by leaving behind a small training force, a robust counter-terrorism force, and an economic support model that is viable in the long-term. Significant intellectual and limited monetary capital must go toward achieving sustainable Afghan economic growth in the mid-to-long-term. Rather than how much is spent in Afghanistan, donors - and in particular, the U.S. as the largest - need to start paying attention more to effectiveness of what is spent.
Ultimately, the most important date on our 2014 calendar should be the April Afghan Presidential election rather than the December withdrawal deadline. If the election is not credible or moderately successful in maintaining the trust of key stakeholders in the democratic progress, the numbers of U.S. troops remaining will not make much difference in the post-election environment. The Afghan people and the international community will be watching closely to ensure that the election is an example of the democratic progress that 13 years of Coalition presence made possible. The troop levels, important as they may be, are only secondary to the success of the political process.
Gianni Koskinas was a military officer for over twenty years and now focuses on economic development projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
MUNIR UZ ZAMAN/AFP/GettyImages
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EXPLORE:AFPAK, AFPAK TOP STORY, AFGHANISTAN, AFPAK CHANNEL, AL QAEDA, MILITARY, NATIONAL SECURITY, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, POLITICS, SECURITY, STATE OF THE UNION, TALIBAN, TERRORISM, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
EXPLORE:AFPAK, AFPAK TOP STORY, AFGHANISTAN, AFPAK CHANNEL, AL QAEDA, MILITARY, NATIONAL SECURITY, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, POLITICS, SECURITY, STATE OF THE UNION, TALIBAN, TERRORISM, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
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...and I am Sid Harth@elcidharth.com
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